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Summary introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are among the largest and most important corporate events.
Companies acquire other companies for a variety of reasons. The most quoted one is without
any doubt the potential additional value from combining two firms, better known as synergy,
while the most obscure and the most controversial one is probably the elimination of future
competition. No matter what the main motive is, measuring M&A future benefits is not an easy
task and is probably more art than exact science. To get a bottom line number, apart from future
cash flows, investors also need to assess a number of qualitative aspects of a deal, such as the
compatibility of corporate cultures of the transaction parties, managers’ skill in M&A execution
etc. With all these uncertainty levels piled up, information asymmetry makes it even harder for
managers to clearly communicate the real value of a deal. What they do in such a situation and
how investors respond is not obvious. In my thesis, I advocate that managers indeed put effort
to overcome the issue of how to convey deal quality. Specifically, I investigate the following
scenarios: managers select the best time to announce a deal and/or they effectively disclose
deal quality in the announcement press releases.
The first alternative is also known as strategic announcement timing. It has attracted
considerable attention in the literature on corporate earnings. However, it is relatively little
known whether managers actually time acquisition announcements, what drives such behavior,
and whether their strategic moves pay off.1 I argue that managers indeed engage in the M&A
announcement timing and that their main motive is to avoid potentially unfavorable outcomes.
To test this conjecture, I exploit a sharp variation in the number of deals around weekends.
The M&A distribution exhibits an unusually high number of deals on Monday (also known as
Merger Monday) and a relatively low percentage of announcements on Fridays.
Combining theory with findings in the literature on earnings announcements, I suggest
that there are at least two pitfalls of Friday that managers try to avoid: investor inattention and
the adverse selection problem. The first argument suggests that managers facing an unfavor-
able market reaction to a deal by inattentive investors will try to avoid such an outcome. A
similar finding is reported in deHaan et al. (2015). The authors document that managers prefer
1Here I stress on the term announcement, not the decision to acquire another company. The latter is extensively
studied in the literature on merger waves.
2
high attention to low attention when they have to announce good news. Importantly, for the
managers to act strategically it is enough that there is a positive probability of low attention.
The ex-post realization of investor inattention on Friday is not crucial since it is not observable
at the announcement time.
The second argument is more complex. Akerlof (1970) explains how information asym-
metry creates uncertainty about quality, which in the end leads to a severe problem of adverse
selection. I identify a very similar issue in the context of M&A announcements when investors
have to understand whether a deal is a good one. Certification is not an impeccable solution
as managers might be reluctant to disclose many details due to the threat of competition. I
argue that the described problem is prevalent on Friday. I base the conjecture on the finding
that investors appear to infer that earnings announcements scheduled for Friday tend to contain
negative news (see deHaan et al., 2015). This result clearly shows that investors are indeed
concerned about whether managers are actually trying to “hide” bad news by releasing them
on Friday. However, it is very unlikely that managers will stay passive and do nothing. I ar-
gue that managers actively engage in the anticipation of investor reaction and strategically time
announcements to avoid a potential negative reaction. In the aftermath of this recursive reason-
ing, managers find it advantageous not to risk that investors misinterpret Friday announcements,
thus, they announce deals on Monday instead.2
I find evidence consistent with managers timing their M&A announcements in order
to anticipate and avoid potential pitfalls, specifically, investor inattention and the possibility
that Friday announcements are interpreted as bad news. I document significant gains when
managers attempt to avoid Friday investor attention. However, the analysis reveals no similar
effect when the decisive factor is the possibility that the market might interpret the announce-
ment as bad news. I also test a number of alternative factors that could explain the day of the
week pattern of M&A announcements (deal complexity, information leakage, and media cov-
erage). Even though I find that some of them hold (deal complexity), the announcement timing
hypothesis could not be invalidated.
The second part of the thesis studies what managers disclose in the M&A announce-
2In the cognition theory and mental modeling, this type of recursive reasoning is also referred to as the second-
order model. “A second-order model is characterized by the recognition that others also hold beliefs about the
desires and beliefs of one’s self, and therefore may act predictively for their own good. The predictions of oneself
by others must be taken into account when predicting those others’ behavior.” – Hedden and Zhang (2002).
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ment press releases. In the joint work with A.F. Wagner, we tackle this question by analyzing
the information content related to intangible assets. We focus on this hard-to-value asset class
for several reasons. Firstly, many mergers and acquisitions are motivated by the intention of
creating extra value from intangible assets. Secondly, over the recent years, the importance of
intangible assets has substantially increased in corporate value in general and in M&As specif-
ically. Finally, this asset class is the most obscure and normally requires a detailed qualitative
explanation.
For our analysis, we develop a novel word list of intangible-related words to capture
what announcement releases say about this asset class. When inspecting announcements, we
follow a common practice in the textual analysis literature, a “bag of words” approach. This
approach is based on parsing announcement files into vectors of words and word counts. Our
measure of the information content (“intangibles talk”) is the frequency of words associated
with intangible assets. We document that deals presented with more “intangibles talk” in ac-
quisition announcements complete more quickly and more frequently.
We propose three different explanations of this finding: advantageous private informa-
tion, agency problems, and overoptimism of managers. The strong negative market reaction
to intangibles talk (also a decrease in post-acquisition operating performance) suggests that
managers do not use intangibles words to disclose advantageous private information about
the target. The agency explanation of the relation between intangibles talk and negative an-
nouncement returns receives no strong support in data. An analysis of insider trades reveals, by
contrast, evidence of managerial overoptimism about deals they describe with intangibles talk.
The overall analysis shows evidence that managers do take actions to communicate
deal quality to investors. They strategically time M&A announcements to avoid potential pit-
falls and unfavorable outcomes. Specifically, they are concerned about Friday inattention and
the adverse selection problem. On the other hand, they do not seem to utilize announcement
releases to convey qualitative deal aspects, such as the extent of intangible assets. In contrast,
the information content of announcements reveals managerial overoptimism.
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Strategic M&A Announcement Timing:
Evidence from Merger Monday
Zoran M. Filipovic´ ∗
Abstract
Drawing on the day of the week pattern of mergers and acquisitions, I investigate whether
managers engage in strategic announcement timing, and if so, whether such a decision
pays off. The findings are consistent with managers timing M&A announcements as they
seek to avoid the anticipated unfavorable market reaction. I document that this strategy
is related to higher stock returns when managers attempt to avoid periods of low investor
attention. However, the analysis reveals no evidence of significant gains when the manage-
rial decisive factor is the possibility that the market might interpret the announcement as
bad news. Furthermore, I find that strategic timing and negotiation complexity help explain
the prevalence of merger announcements on Mondays (the Merger Monday phenomenon)
and its flip side, a low percentage of M&A announcements on Friday.
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1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisition have been attracting researchers’ attention for decades. Besides a va-
riety of different motives for acquisitions, the reason why M&As are so intriguing probably
lies in the fact that their announcements do not convey a sharp message about the deal qual-
ity and the prospect of future success. This makes M&As quite susceptible to judgment and
misinterpretation that likely leads to the managerial strategic behavior.
One possible maneuver managers might make is the timing of announcements. To in-
vestigate whether they actually do that and with what objective, I exploit the prevalence of
M&A announcements on Mondays (the Merger Monday phenomenon) and its less known flip
side, a relatively low percentage of announcements on Fridays.1 I argue that one of the main
factors that contribute to the deal clustering on Monday is the strategic announcement timing it-
self. I rely on the documented pitfalls of Friday and pre-announcement variables that are likely
correlated with the incentive to avoid the Friday drawbacks. The sharp variation in the number
of deals around weekends provides an excellent setting for the investigation of how managers
make decisions as a response to the anticipated investor reaction.
The question of strategic announcement timing has gained substantial attention in fi-
nancial literature. While the topic is extensively studied in the context of corporate earnings,
it is relatively unexplored in the area of mergers and acquisitions. Recent studies suggest that
investor behavioral biases are one of the main reasons why managers engage in the earnings
release timing (see, e.g. DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; deHaan et al., 2015). The findings are
consistent with managers reporting low earnings during periods of low attention as they attempt
to “hide” bad news. A study with similar results has been conducted for M&A announcements
(Louis and Sun, 2010), but a more recent publication reports evidence against the previous
findings (Michaely et al., 2016). Given that there is no consensus, my study attempts to make
further progress in our understanding of whether and with what objective managers engage
in the strategic timing of the largest corporate events, i.e. mergers and acquisitions. In con-
trast to the previous studies, which correlate various ex-post measures of investor inattention
and variation in the announcement signal (good vs. bad), I tackle the problem by linking ex-
1The term merger in the Merger Monday phrase is used as a synonym for any M&A deal. For simplicity, I will
use mostly M&A.
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ante observables and the managers’ propensity to engage in the announcement timing. This
approach enables me to directly investigate how managers respond to the anticipated market
reaction.
The analysis confirms the strategic behavior conjecture. The findings are consistent with
managers timing M&A announcements as they seek to avoid the anticipated unfavorable market
reaction. I document that the decisive factors are investor behavioral biases (i.e. inattention) and
the adverse selection problem (i.e. a concern that the market might interpret announcements
as bad news).2 Both explanatory factors predict a higher propensity that a deal is announced
on Monday instead of Friday. However, I show that the managers’ strategy yields significant
gains only when the objective is to avoid investor inattention. To check whether my results are
robust, I test a number of alternative stories that potentially explain the variation in the number
of announcements around weekends. I identify the complexity of the negotiation process as
an additional factor that explains the deal clustering on Monday. The strategic announcement
timing hypothesis holds under all alternative specifications.
I examine M&A deals in the sample from 1990 to 2016 with a public bidder domiciled
in the U.S. Firstly, I check whether two key implicit assumptions hold: (i) there is a day of the
week M&A pattern with a significantly high (low) percentage of deals announced on Monday
(Friday), and (ii) the company public status (i.e. the market reaction reflected in stock prices)
induces managers to behave strategically. I confirm the validity of both assumptions and show
that there exists a significant weekday announcement pattern in the sample. Monday accounts
for more than 25% of deals while the share of Friday is only about 14%. Furthermore, there
is a striking contrast between the day of the week distribution of public-to-public and private-
to-private deals. While the former exhibits a large difference in the number of deals around
weekends, the latter remains nearly flat across the week.
Next, I examine whether pre-announcement observable variables, which are likely cor-
related with unwanted market reaction, predict higher managers’ propensity to act strategically.
I examine two factors that might induce managers to avoid Friday and announce a deal on
Monday instead: Friday investor inattention (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009), and concern about
negative market reaction to Friday announcements. The latter is based on the finding that in-
2deHaan et al. (2015) report that in the presence of uncertainty, investors respond negatively to the scheduled
Friday announcements.
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vestors infer that Friday earnings announcements tend to contain negative news (deHaan et al.,
2015). As a measure of anticipated investor attention on Friday, I use the pre-announcement
difference between relative trading volumes3 on Friday and the other weekdays. To quantify
the managers’ concern that the market might interpret Friday announcements as bad news, I
observe their past behavior in similar situations and construct a measure of managerial propen-
sity to avoid announcing good news on Friday.4 As an example of good news, I take earnings
announcements that “beat” the forecast because they signal a clear positive message. The man-
agers’ concern that investors might interpret the scheduling of earnings release for Friday as
a signal of forthcoming bad news is obviously reflected in the managers’ propensity to avoid
scheduling good earnings announcements (those that beat the forecast) for Friday.
I document that both factors predict higher probability that a deal is announced on Mon-
day relative to Friday. To assess potential gains from such strategic decisions, I analyze the
difference in bidder abnormal returns between Monday and Friday while keeping the level of
examined pre-announcement factors constant. I do not find evidence of significant negative
difference, meaning that the managers’ actions are not suboptimal. However, higher abnor-
mal stock returns are observed only when the managerial decision is based on the anticipated
investor inattention.
Finally, to test the robustness of the main results, I examine several alternative explana-
tions of the variation in the number of announcements around weekends. One possible story
says that complex deals are typically finalized over weekends due to their structure that requires
extra work and is related to complicated negotiations. Another explanation is that managers
want to avoid stock price fluctuations caused by information leakage during the negotiation
process. In this case, weekends are a natural choice for the deal closing. Finally, it is also pos-
sible that acquisitions get more media coverage if announced on Mondays. I find support for the
deal complexity explanation, but not for the latter two. However, the strategic announcement
hypothesis holds even when I check for the deal complexity in the analysis.
In conclusion, my evidence is consistent with managers timing their M&A announce-
ments in order to anticipate and avoid potential pitfalls, specifically, investor inattention and
3Daily trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding.
4More precisely, the measure is defined as: 1 – (#quarterly EAs that beat the analyst consensus forecast and
are announced on Friday over a 3-year period before the M&A announcement) / (#all quarterly EAs that beat the
analyst consensus forecast and are announced over a 3-year period before the M&A announcement).
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the possibility that Friday announcements are interpreted as bad news. The possible benefits of
Monday itself, such as more media coverage, might play only a secondary role, if any at all.
Overall, when dealing with important and complex corporate events (e.g. M&As) that do not
convey a sharp message, besides considering characteristics of the event itself, managers also
actively engage in the anticipation of investor reaction and strategically time announcements
to avoid unfavorable outcomes. This study helps to understand better how companies interact
with market participants and how their maneuvers lead to seemingly surprising phenomena,
like Merger Monday.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes previous literature
and my contribution. Section 3 develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 introduces data sources
and describes how I construct the sample. Section 5 presents the main analysis and empirical
results. Robustness tests are shown in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature and contribution
The literature on the M&A market timing could be broadly split in two branches. The first
and more developed branch studies the managers’ decision to acquire another company. It is
focused on deal clustering over rather long periods of time which are labeled as merger waves
and typically span horizons of several years. In contrast, the second branch investigates the
strategic timing of announcements and analyzes much shorter periods. The factors driving
each type of strategic market timing are very different. Merger waves are normally driven by
a break-through in technology, market and economic conditions, and regulatory changes (see
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Harford, 2005; Rhodes-
Kropf et al., 2005; Maksimovic et al., 2013; Ahern and Harford, 2014). On the other hand,
strategic behavior in the context of mergers and acquisitions is not extensively studied. There
is evidence that investor behavioral biases are related to the decision of announcement time
(Louis and Sun, 2010), but also against this relation (Michaely et al., 2016). The deal structure
is mentioned as another factor in (Branch et al., 2001). Thus, the question of M&A strategic
announcement timing and of its driving factors remains relevant. I contribute to this literature
by providing evidence that managers indeed time acquisition announcements. I argue that their
main objective is to avoid the unfavorable market reaction to announcements, which is a likely
10
consequence of investor inattention and adverse selection.
The paper also adds to the broad literature on bidder returns. I report evidence that,
besides deal and company characteristics, the managers’ strategic moves are another impor-
tant explanatory factor of bidder abnormal returns around M&A announcements. The previous
literature documents that bidder announcement returns are driven by the target public status,
payment method, and bidder and target (deal) size. Private target deals yield positive bidder ab-
normal returns, while acquisitions of public targets yield negative abnormal returns (see Fuller
et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; Betton et al., 2008). Furthermore, Schneider and Spalt (2017)
document a negative (positive) relationship between the deal (bidder) size and the bidder an-
nouncement returns for public target acquisitions. The relationship is opposite in the sample
of private target deals. Stock payment is associated with negative bidder abnormal returns in
the sample of public target deals, and with positive returns when the target is a private firm
(Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Moeller et al., 2007; Betton et al., 2008; Savor and Lu, 2009).
Moreover, my analysis is also a part of the previous research on the weekend effect, also
known as the Monday effect, the day-of-the-week effect or the Monday seasonal. This market
phenomenon refers to the tendency of stocks to exhibit relatively low returns on Mondays com-
pared to those on Fridays. I contribute to the literature by documenting that M&A announce-
ments cluster on Monday and by analyzing the effect on bidder stock returns. Specifically, I
find no significant difference in the event period returns between companies that announce deals
on Monday and those that announce deals on the other days of the week. A study by French
(1980), a seminal article on the subject5, reported that the average return for Monday was sig-
nificantly negative from 1953 through 1977 while positive for the other four days of the week.
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) find a relative increase in trading activity by individuals on
Mondays who are more likely to sell on Monday rather than to buy. Damodaran (1989) studies
the news weekly cycle and finds that a certain portion of negative Monday returns is explained
by adverse news announced on Friday. Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) find Monday negative
returns are a consequence of returns in prior trading sessions, i.e. Friday’s return. Chang et al.
(1998) suggest that information processing is different on Mondays than on other weekdays.
However, the information processing asymmetry is limited to macroeconomic news. Chen and
5French (1980) is not the very first study reporting the existence of the weekend effect. Merrill (1966), Cross
(1973) and Gibbons and Hess (1979) all document the phenomenon, but their studies provide less comprehensive
analysis and discussion of the results.
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Singal (2003) argue that speculative short sales contribute to the weekend effect as short sell-
ers tend to close their speculative positions on Fridays and reestablish new short positions on
Mondays. However, exploiting an exogenous short-selling prohibition of certain stocks on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Gao et al. (2015) find a strong weekend effect both before and
after the prohibition for stocks that are allowed to be sold short as well as those that are not.6
In the meantime, the Monday effect remains without a firm explanation as researchers have not
reached a consensus yet.
The current literature suggests that the investor limited attention significantly affects
stock prices. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) document that extraneous news distract investors leading
to weaker market reactions to relevant news. They conclude that, apart from the post-earnings
announcement drift, limited attention might be the source of underreaction to a variety of pub-
lic corporate news events documented in the literature. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that
investors are less attentive to earnings announcements on Fridays. Similar conclusions are doc-
umented in Louis and Sun (2010) for mergers announced on Friday. However, Michaely et al.
(2016) argue that the evidence of investor limited attention on Friday disappears when they
check for the selection bias. While individual investors are more likely to suffer limited atten-
tion, evidence suggests that experts, such as analysts (Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997; Teoh and
Wong, 2002), also fail to consider all relevant information. Moreover, Fang et al. (2014) docu-
ment that professional investors are subject to limited attention as well. They find that mutual
funds tend to buy stocks with media coverage more heavily than those without. The research
results suggest that an increase in investor attention induces stronger buy pressure and gener-
ates higher stock prices. Barber and Odean (2007) document attention-driven buying and argue
that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks appearing in
the news, and stocks experiencing high abnormal trading volume. Hou et al. (2009) use trad-
ing volume as a proxy for attention and find that price momentum is stronger for high volume
stocks and in up markets. Furthermore, the literature documents the importance of press cov-
erage and shows that investors are more likely to process salient news and ignore non-salient
news (Ho and Michaely, 1988; Klibanoff et al., 1998). Huberman and Regev (2001) provide a
remarkable example of how enthusiastic public attention induced a permanent increase in share
6Recently, there are attempts to link the investors’ mood with Monday effect (Abu Bakar et al., 2014). The
link is based on the psychology studies documenting that mood tends to be lowest on Monday and highest on
Friday and during the weekend. According to these studies, investors are more pessimistic early in the week and
this supposedly explains the negative returns on Monday.
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prices, even though no genuinely new information had been disclosed. Fang and Peress (2009)
find that earnings announcements that are covered in news media generate a stronger price re-
action and a less subsequent drift than those that are not. I add to this literature by showing
that ex-ante measures of investor inattention play an important role in the decision making pro-
cess of both managers and investors. While I do not strictly investigate whether investors are
less attentive on Friday, I argue that the concern about this behavioral bias is one of the major
components of the strategic announcement timing of M&A deals.
3 Institutional background and hypothesis development
3.1 Main hypotheses
The exact motivation for the choice of announcement day is unobservable. To examine whether
managers engage in the strategic M&A announcement timing, I rely on the documented pitfalls
of Friday and pre-announcement variables that are presumably correlated with the incentive to
avoid Friday drawbacks. I formulate the following three main hypotheses to test the announce-
ment timing conjecture.
I start by investigating the day of the week pattern of M&As. Exploiting the findings
in the literature on earnings announcements, I conjecture that managers likely try to avoid the
drawbacks of Friday (e.g. investor inattention). This would lead to a sharp drop in the number
of Friday announcements and a surge of those on Monday. The other days are expected to
exhibit a rather flat number of deals. I formulate the first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: M&A announcements are not uniformly distributed across the week. Monday
exhibits the highest and Friday the lowest number of deals.
The literature on earnings announcements reports two pitfalls of Friday: investor inat-
tention and a negative reaction to the scheduled Friday announcements. These factors are very
likely to have an important role in the context of acquisition announcements as well. Investor
inattention on Friday has gained on importance in the recent financial literature. There is evi-
dence that investors are less attentive on Friday (see e.g., DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Louis
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and Sun, 2010), but also against it (Michaely et al., 2016). However, for the managers to act
strategically it is enough that there is a positive probability of inattention. The key point is how
they ex-ante perceive the cost of announcing a good deal during periods when low attention is
likely.7 I advocate that managers facing an unfavorable market reaction to a deal by inattentive
investors will try to avoid such an outcome. In other words, they will likely avoid Friday and
postpone their announcements to Monday.8 This constitutes my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (Investor Inattention): The anticipated investor inattention on Friday predicts
a lower propensity that managers announce M&A deals on this day of the week.
M&A announcements are unquestionably flooded with information asymmetry and
quality uncertainty. As explained in Akerlof (1970), such situations lead to the problem of
adverse selection. I argue that this issue is particularly acute on Fridays when managers might
be tempted to announce “lemon” acquisitions in the attempt to hide them. The evidence that
this a very realistic scenario and poses a real threat to investors can be found in the literature
on earnings announcements. deHaan et al. (2015) document that investors infer that earnings
announcements scheduled for Friday tend to contain adverse news. Authors report significantly
negative returns when the market is notified of a forthcoming Friday announcement. This re-
sult clearly shows that investors are concerned about whether managers are actually trying to
“hide” bad news by releasing them on Friday. Given the information asymmetry about the
deal rationale, this argument is certainly a credible concern also in the context of mergers and
acquisitions. However, it is very unlikely that managers will stay passive and do nothing to
avoid this adverse selection problem. I argue that managers actively engage in the anticipa-
tion of investor reaction and strategically time announcements to avoid potential unfavorable
outcomes. In the aftermath of this recursive reasoning, managers find it advantageous not to
risk that investors misinterpret Friday announcements, thus, they announce deals on Monday
instead.9 This insight generates my third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (Adverse Selection): The managers’ concern about the anticipated negative
7I note that ex-post realizations might be different from managers’ ex-ante perceptions of investor inattention.
8Monday is a natural choice as it is the first working day after Friday. I do not see any convincing reason
why managers would wait more (until Tuesday, or later) and risk that the market starts speculating on information
leakage while waiting for the official announcement.
9In the cognition theory and mental modeling, this type of recursive reasoning is also referred to as the second-
order model. “A second-order model is characterized by the recognition that others also hold beliefs about the
desires and beliefs of one’s self, and therefore may act predictively for their own good. The predictions of oneself
by others must be taken into account when predicting those others’ behavior.” – Hedden and Zhang (2002).
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market reaction to Friday announcements decreases the probability that they announce M&A
deals on this day of the week.
3.2 Additional hypotheses
I also examine several alternative factors that potentially explain the day of the week pattern
of M&A announcements and could invalidate the announcement timing hypothesis: deal com-
plexity, information leakage, and media coverage.
The first story that might explain the M&A deal clustering on Monday attributes this
phenomenon to deal complexity. I identify two channels of how deal complexity contributes
to Merger Monday. Firstly, the overall transaction workload, which is correlated with deal
complexity, increases the likelihood that the deal will be finalized over a weekend. Branch et al.
(2001) propose that mergers involving large transactions may be more likely to be finalized over
a weekend and announced on the following Monday.10 Secondly, complex deals are intuitively
related to costly and complicated negotiation between the transaction parties. Weekends allow
for undisrupted negotiation and provide enough time for the process to get finalized. Branch
et al. (2001) note that even assembling the members of the two firms’ boards of directors along
with their supporting casts (investment bankers, lawyers, accountants, etc.) is not a trivial task
and often requires a weekend as these important people have busy schedules. Based on these
observations, I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 (Deal Complexity): Complex deals are often finalized over weekends and an-
nounced on Monday.
M&A deals are quite sensitive to information leakage. If unofficial news about the deal
get to the market during negotiation, investors are likely to start speculating on that. Changes
in stock prices might trigger a renegotiation of the deal terms and introduce unwanted delays
in the whole process, or even lead to the deal termination. This is probably the least wanted
scenario before the deal closing. Since information leakage is not easy to prevent, managers
likely choose to finalize negotiation over a weekend. This insight generates the following
10Moreover, in its dictionary, the Financial Times suggest that one of the Merger Monday determinants is in fact
the workload (“last-minute preparations, public relations planning and other issues”), which is in fact correlated
with deal complexity (and the deal size), see http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=merger-Monday.
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hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 (Information Leakage): To minimize the stock price impact of information
leakage during negotiation, managers choose to finalize M&A deals over a weekend.
The third explanation is based on the importance of media. While the spectrum of why
managers crave media coverage is rather wide, there is little doubt that visibility is very impor-
tant for corporations and the actions they take. The financial literature documents that stock
prices do respond significantly to newspaper publications (Ho and Michaely, 1988). Extensive
media coverage generates buying pressure that is driven by both individual (Barber and Odean,
2007) and professional (Fang et al., 2014) investors. These findings suggest that the managers’
decision to announce a deal on Monday is potentially driven by media coverage that is higher
on this day of the week. This conjecture is also cited in Louis and Sun (2010) – “According
to Howard Rubenstein, president of Rubenstein Associates Inc., a New York-based public rela-
tions firm, clients “generally want their transactions well publicized and that’s often easier to
achieve on a Monday””. I formulate the last hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 6 (Media Coverage): M&As announced on Monday get more media coverage
than M&As announced on the other weekdays.
4 Data
4.1 Sample selection
I collect M&A deals from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) database. I download all
announced acquisitions with a U.S. bidder for the period 1990-2016. To construct the main
sample, I keep only bidders that are public companies, and targets that are either a subsidiary, a
public or private company.11 The control sample consists of transactions with a private bidder.
I collect transactions with at least a $1 million deal value, as in Moeller et al. (2004). Following
Bargeron et al. (2008), I exclude deals that are labeled as recapitalizations, repurchases, self-
tenders, or exchange offers. I download stock market data from CRSP and the most recent
11Bidders that are labeled as government, investor, joint venture, mutually owned, subsidiary, private, or have
unknown public status are excluded from the sample.
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annual report from COMPUSTAT that is filed no more than a year before the announcement. To
link SDC to CRSP, I use 6-digit historical CUSIPs. Then, I link CRSP to COMPUSTAT using
PERMNO identifiers. The resulting sample consists of 37,635 deals. I download quarterly
earnings announcement data from I/B/E/S. As a source of news articles I use Factiva.
4.2 Attention measure
In contrast to the previous research that relies on the post-announcement proxies of investor
attention (see DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2009; Louis and Sun, 2010),
I focus on ex-ante variables that are observable by managers. Specifically, I measure pre-
announcement average relative trading volume on Friday and contrast it with those on the
other days of the week. The day of the week averages are calculated over one year before the
announcement. More formally, the ex-ante Friday inattention measure is defined as following:
FIi =
1
4
T h
∑
d=Mo
(
RV mi,d
)
−RV mi,Fr, (1a)
RV mi,d = mean
(
RVi, j| j∼d
)
, (1b)
RVi,t =
SHTi,t
SHOi,t
, (1c)
where FI stands for Friday inattention, RV is the relative trading volume, m denotes the mean
value, SHT and SHO are the numbers of traded and outstanding shares, respectively, i is the
indicator of a deal, and t and j are the date indicators. The day of the week is denoted by d,
while j ∼ d means that j is chosen to correspond to d. In the other words, I keep only RV on
Mondays when I calculate the Monday mean relative volume (RV mi,Mo), and so on.
4.3 Friday adverse selection measure
To quantify the managers’ concern that the market might interpret Friday announcements as
bad news, I construct a measure that is equal to one minus the managers’ propensity to an-
nounce good news on Friday. Perfect examples of good news are earnings announcements
(EAs) that “beat” the analyst consensus forecast because they signal a clear positive message.
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The managers’ concern that investors might interpret the scheduling of EAs for Friday as a
signal of forthcoming bad news is obviously reflected in the managers’ propensity to actually
schedule EAs that beat the forecast for Friday. The measure is formally defined as:
FASi = 1−
#QEAFri,beat
#QEAi,beat
, (2)
where #QEAFri,beat is the number of quarterly EAs over a 3-year period before the M&A an-
nouncement that beat the analyst consensus forecast and are announced on Friday, and #QEAi,beat
is the number of all quarterly EAs over a 3-year period before the M&A announcement that
beat the analyst consensus forecast.
4.4 Deal complexity measures
I use three different measures as a proxy for deal complexity. The first measure is deal size.
Consistent with Grinstein and Hribar (2004), I expect that larger deals are more complex and
thus require more effort. Deal size is correlated with both aspects of deal complexity that I
introduced in Section 3, the overall complexity reflected in higher workload, and complicated
negotiation. The other two measures are the number of target advisors and the target termina-
tion fee dummy. The intuition is that negotiation becomes more complicated if the target hires
more deal advisors. A large number of advisors means more bargain power. It also signals that
the target managers will try hard to negotiate the highest possible price and extract as many
non-monetary benefits as they can. On the other hand, the bidder is expected to opt for the
opposite, that is, to minimize the overall deal price. Given that the negotiation process is final-
ized successfully, the likelihood that the bidder will want to seal the agreement and prevent the
target from walking away from the deal increases with the negotiation complexity and related
costs. As a result, the bidder will likely require the target termination fee clause.
4.5 Media coverage measures
To analyze the impact of media coverage on the decision to announce an M&A deal on Mon-
day, I hand collect news articles related to M&A announcements from Factiva, a global news
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database and a research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company.12 In order to facilitate the pro-
cedure and due to the large number of deals, I restrict the sample to large deals – those that are
$5 billion or larger in size. The decision to analyze media coverage for large deals is justified
by the fact that large deals exhibit the greatest degree of clustering on Monday.13 Hence, the
media coverage effect, if any, should be observable in this subsample. As a proxy of media
coverage, I use the number of news articles on the announcement day. I also collect the number
of news over the next 7 calendar days (the announcement day included) to capture the effect of
the full business week following the announcement.
4.6 Sample characteristics
Table 1 presents summary statistics. All dollar amounts are expressed as CPI-adjusted Decem-
ber 2016 U.S. dollars. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.25th and 99.75th percentile
in order to eliminate the effect of outliers.14
The sample has the average deal size of $450 million while the median is only $60
million. However, these values are not surprising as acquisitions of small firms are in general
much more frequent than acquisitions of large corporations. The bidder size follows the same
pattern – the average bidder has a market capitalization of $10 billion, that is about twelve times
more than the median bidder market cap of $0.82 billion. The deal relative size, calculated as
the deal size over bidder market capitalization, is on average 0.38. Bidders are profitable firms
with the annual ROA (return on assets defined as EBITDA over total assets) of 8.6% and the
market-to-book ratio of 3.5. In my sample, more than 21% of target firms are publicly listed
companies, 47% are privately held firms and about 31% are subsidiaries. As a payment method,
bidders use only cash in 29% of acquisitions. The attitude of the target management is friendly
in 97% of deals while 3% of them employ a defensive tactic. The average target hires one firm
to act as a financial or legal advisor. A total of 11% of targets are liable to pay a termination fee
12Apart from its extensive coverage (nearly 33,000 sources as of 2018), Factiva is a convenient tool since it
provides a number of advanced search commands and field tags to refine and target results. For example, one can
search for a specific phrase that appears in the predefined number of words at the beginning (or at the end) of the
article, or for two phrases that are separated by no more than a predefined number of words, etc. It also supports
wildcards, which are a very useful feature.
13I confirm this statement in unreported tests.
14All the results hold when the sample is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. I use the symmetric 0.25%
level to minimize modification of data.
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to the bidder if they decide to withdraw from the acquisition agreement. About 18% of deals
are cross-border acquisitions, while less than 2% of deals have more than one bidder.
On average, Monday and Friday bidders are nearly identical in size. However, Monday
bidders are more profitable (about 1%) and acquire about $300 million bigger targets. They
use the target termination fee provision more often and their targets hire more advisors. Also,
Monday bidders face competition and defense tactics more frequently, but they complete their
acquisitions more often than companies that announce deals on Friday.
I measure bidder announcement returns as CAR(-1,1), the 3-day cumulative abnormal
returns for the bidder firm using the Carhart four-factor model, around the announcement.
Model parameters are estimated over days [-280, -31].15 I find that the sample has a positive
3-day bidder cumulative abnormal return of 1.1% on average (0.33% median CAR).16 The
average bidder CAR is not significantly different between Monday and Friday subsamples.
The ex-ante measure of Friday investor inattention (FI) is significantly higher for deals
announced on Monday than for those announced on Friday. The same pattern is observed for
the measure of adverse selection problem (FAS). These two findings are both consistent with
the announcement timing hypothesis. In other words, managers facing a higher probability of
unfavorable outcomes are more likely to act strategically. As a result, we observe the afore-
mentioned pattern in FI and FAS variables.
The overall sample summary statistics are consistent with the values reported in the
previous literature (see Moeller et al., 2004; Schneider and Spalt, 2017).
[Table 1 ABOUT HERE]
15I use the same interval to estimate the benchmark returns as Schneider and Spalt (2017). They use the market
model instead of the Carhart four-factor model. I confirm that findings are not affected by the choice of the model.
16Consistent with the literature (e.g. Moeller et al., 2004; Schneider and Spalt, 2017) bidder CAR(-1,1) is
negative for public target deals (−0.98%) and positive for non-public target deals: 2.09% when the target is a
private firm and 2.34% when the target is a subsidiary.
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5 Empirical results
5.1 Day of the week pattern
I start the analysis by checking the expected outcomes of the M&A announcement timing. If
managers really make strategic decisions about announcement time and if there is a common
factor that affects most of them, I would expect to observe a clear pattern in the M&A distri-
bution. I argue that the important aspects that managers care about are investor inattention and
possible misinterpretations of deal quality, which is followed by an adverse market reaction.
Literature documents that both of these factors are related to Friday. Therefore, the number of
M&As is expected to exhibit a spike on Monday, stay relatively stable over the following three
days of the week, and sharply drop on Friday. This is precisely what I find when I plot the
M&A deal frequency by the day of the week (Figure 1a). The Monday deal percentage (about
25%) indeed exceeds the percentage on Friday (about 14%), while the other days of the week
stay close to 20%.
[Figure 1 ABOUT HERE]
Another expected pattern is related to the type of companies that are likely to act strate-
gically. Intuitively, private bidders do not have any reason to act in such a way if a target is
also private. Neither of the transaction parties can be directly affected by the stock market
reaction.17 On the other hand, public companies acquiring public targets are the category that
is most likely to take actions that maximize stock price. Figure 1b confirms the previous con-
jecture. Public-to-public transactions exhibit a strong deal clustering on Monday and a low
percentage of deals on Friday. In contrast, the distribution of private-to-private deals remains
nearly flat across the week.
Table 2 presents detailed information on the day of week distribution of acquisition
announcements. It also reports the results of the chi-square goodness-of-fit tests for the deal
percentage against the uniform distribution across the week. The results are consistent with
the graphical evidence. The test rejects the null hypothesis that M&A deals are uniformly
17I recognize that there still could exist indirect channels, such as the link between media coverage and cost of
debt.
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distributed across the week in the full sample as well as in the public-to-public subsample.
This confirms the validity of the first hypothesis. However, the uniform distribution of deal
announcements could not be rejected in the control subsample of private-to-private acquisitions.
Moreover, the unreported chi-square test of independence performed on a set that combines the
full sample and the control sample confirms that the announcement day and the bidder public
status are not independent. Additionally, the chi-square goodness-of-fit test rejects the null
hypothesis that the day of the week distributions of deals with a public bidder and of those with
a private bidder are equal. In conclusion, it is likely that managers carefully analyze market
reaction and take actions to maximize the announcement outcome. The following sections
analyze this conjecture more formally.
[Table 2 ABOUT HERE]
5.2 Investor inattention
To test the Investor Inattention Hypothesis, I model the bidder propensity to announce a deal
on Friday (Monday) using logistic regression. The hypothesis states that investor inattention
(FI) induces managers to avoid Friday, which then increases their propensity to announce a
deal on Monday. The results are reported in Table 3. In the first two specifications (with
and without control variables), I explicitly model the probability of Friday announcements in
the full sample. The FI coefficients are significant and negative. This means that the ex-ante
measure of investor inattention on Friday predicts a lower propensity that investors announce
a deal on Friday. To illustrate the effect, an increase of one standard deviation in investor
inattention translates to a 4.1% decrease in the odds of announcing a deal on Friday relative to
the other days of the week (Regression 2).18
In the following two specifications, I focus on the subsample of Monday and Friday
announcements and analyze the choice between these two days. The regressions reveal that an
increase in FI predicts a higher probability that managers choose Monday instead of Friday. An
increase of one standard deviation in investor inattention causes a 5.7% increase in the odds of
announcing a deal on Monday relative to Friday (Regression 4).
18The value is calculated as e−0.207×0.20− 1 = −4.06%. The decrease is equivalent to a 49% probability of
announcing a deal on Friday.
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[Table 3 ABOUT HERE]
The analysis confirms that managers indeed consider investor attention when making a
decision about the M&A announcement date. The ex-ante measure of investor inattention on
Friday predicts both a lower probability that managers announce a deal on Friday and a higher
probability that they do it on Monday.
5.3 Adverse selection
The Adverse Selection Hypothesis postulates that the managers’ concern about the anticipated
negative market reaction to Friday announcements decreases the probability that they will an-
nounce M&A deals on this day of the week. To test this, I construct a measure of the managers’
concern (FAS) that is based on their propensity to avoid announcing good news on Friday (see
Equation (2)).
To test the hypothesis, I conduct a similar analysis as in the previous section, but I take
FAS as the main explanatory variable instead of FI. The logistic regression results are presented
in Table 4. The FAS variable is significant in all regressions. It predicts a lower probability that
managers announce a deal on Friday relative to the other days of the week. The effect is
also economically significant. An increase of one standard deviation in the managers’ concern
about adverse selection on Friday predicts a 5.8% decrease in the odds of announcing a deal
on Friday relative to the other days of the week (Regression 2).19 Also, FAS predicts a higher
probability that managers choose Monday instead of Friday (Regression 3 and 4). To quantify
it, an increase of one standard deviation of FAS predicts an increase of 7.5% in the odds of
announcing a deal on Monday instead of Friday (Regression 4).
[Table 4 ABOUT HERE]
In sum, I find evidence that the Adverse Selection Hypothesis holds. That is, managers
are indeed concerned about the negative market reaction to Friday announcements. When they
19The value is calculated as e−0.313×0.19− 1 = −5.77%. The decrease is equivalent to 48.5% probability of
announcing a deal on Friday.
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make a decision about when to announce an M&A deal, besides other factors, they also take
into account how investors might interpret such a choice.
5.4 Returns to announcement timing
Given the evidence that managers time M&A announcements to avoid the pitfalls of Friday, a
natural question is whether their strategic maneuvers actually pay off, or at least do not cause
stock price losses. To assess potential gains from such strategic decisions, I analyze the dif-
ference in the bidder abnormal returns between Monday and Friday while keeping the level of
the examined pre-announcement explanatory variables (FI and FAS) constant. Simply put, I
regress bidder cumulative abnormal returns on FI and FAS variables and their interaction terms
with the Monday dummy. This method enables me to effectively keep the variable level con-
stant while looking at the return that is a result of Monday itself. If managers are successful in
the M&A announcement timing, we should observe a positive (or at least non-negative) impact
on stock prices for the given level of FI or FAS. The results of the analysis are presented in
Table 5.
[Table 5 ABOUT HERE]
The first regression shows that bidder stock returns are not different between Monday
and Friday on average. However, this is not surprising because not all Monday announcements
are strategically timed. To estimate the effect of announcement timing (i.e. shift from Friday
to Monday), I look at the interaction between Monday and the incentive to engage in timing.
Firstly, I interact the Monday dummy with the measure of ex-ante investor inattention on Friday
(Regression 2). Then I look at the Monday interaction with the measure of managers’ concern
about the market adverse reaction to Friday announcements (Regression 3). Finally, I include
both interactions in the same regression.
Regression 2 reveals that the stock price effect of announcement timing is positive and
significant. Furthermore, it depends on the level of investor inattention, that is, the larger
the potential inattention, the higher the benefits of announcement timing. This is an intuitive
result. Specifically, managers that observe FI at the level of the 99th percentile of the overall
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distribution gain 1.16% by announcing a deal on Monday instead of Friday (Regression 2).20
The gain is 0.54% for FI at the 95th percentile, 0.12% at the 75th percentile and 0.02% at the
mean FI. I find no evidence of significant gains when the decisive factor to time announcements
is the possibility that the market might interpret the announcement as bad news, see Regression
3. Importantly, such a decision does not lead to negative stock returns either. The overall results
remain qualitatively unchanged when I include both announcement timing variables (and their
interactions with the Monday dummy) in the same regression.
6 Robustness tests
I document that M&A announcement timing explains a variation in the number of deals around
weekends. Nevertheless, there are several alternative factors that might explain the surge of
M&A announcements on Monday and a symmetric decrease in the deal count on Friday: deal
complexity, information leakage, and media coverage.
The Deal Complexity Hypothesis says that complex deals are typically finalized over
a weekend and announced on Monday because of extra workload and/or complicated nego-
tiation. To test it, I conduct a series of logistic regressions in which I model the managers’
propensity to announce a deal on Monday. All three measures have positive and statistically
significant coefficients when controlling for bidder and deal characteristics (year and industry
fixed effects included), see Table 6. The effect is economically significant too. An increase of
one standard deviation in deal size is related to a 17.8% increase in the odds of announcing a
deal on Monday, calculated at the average deal size (Regression 2).21 Similarly, an increase
of one standard deviation in the number of target advisors is related to a 13% increase in the
odds of announcing a deal on Monday (Regression 4). Regression 6 shows that the Monday
announcement odds for deals with the target termination fee are 44.8% higher than the odds
for deals without it – a strong effect indeed.22 The deal complexity measures remain both
statistically and economically significant even when I use all three of them in the same regres-
20It is calculated as 2.108×0.549, where the second number is the FI 99th percentile.
21The value is calculated as e0.099×ln(
2111.4+498.6
498.6 )− 1 = 17.8%, that is equivalent to the probability of Monday
announcement of 54.1%. Alternatively, a 100% increase in deals size is related to a 7.1% [= e0.099×ln(2)− 1]
increase in the odds of announcing a deal on Monday, regardless of the value that deal size is held at.
22The calculation with the standard deviation instead of the binary change (No→Yes) in target termination fee
yields 12.2%.
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sion (specification 7). The coefficients decrease substantially. However, such a sharp decrease
was expected because these three variables are correlated (e.g., correlation of deal size and the
number of target advisors is about 60%).
[Table 6 ABOUT HERE]
Next, I check whether the complexity argument could invalidate the announcement tim-
ing conjecture. I combine the analyses from Table 3 and Table 4 with the complexity expla-
nation. The results are shown in Table 7. Both ex-ante variables that explain the managers’
strategic behavior (FI and FAS) remain significant in all specifications. Friday inattention (FI)
and the managers’ concern about the adverse market reaction to Friday announcements (FAS)
predict a lower probability that deals are announced on Friday after controlling for either of
the complexity measures (Regressions 1-6). Also, FI and FAS a predict higher probability
that managers choose Monday instead of Friday in the subsample of Monday and Friday an-
nouncements regardless of deal complexity (Regressions 6-12). In sum, even though I find that
complex deals are indeed finalized over weekends and announced on Monday, this explanations
does not reject the announcement timing hypothesis.
[Table 7 ABOUT HERE]
Another explanation is that managers want to avoid stock price fluctuations caused by
information leakage during the negotiation process. In this case, weekends are a natural choice
for the deal closing. I use two variables as proxies for the sensitivity to information leakage: a
dummy variable equal to one for bidders with high stock price volatility and a dummy equal to
one when the target operates in the high-tech industry.23
The logistic regression results are presented in Table 8. I do not find evidence that
information sensitivity proxies predict a higher probability of Monday M&A announcements.
On the contrary, bidders that experienced a higher volatility of their stock price are more likely
to announce deals on Friday and less likely to do it on Monday (Regression 1 and 3). This
finding is inconsistent with the Information Leakage Hypothesis. However, it is consistent with
23I define high-tech industries as drugs (SIC codes 2833-2836), research and development services (8731-8734),
programming (7371-7379), computers (3570-3577), or electronics (3600-3674), as in Baginski et al. (2004).
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the conjecture that bidders with highly volatile shares actually prefer low attention periods to
avoid high swings in stock prices. On the other hand, bidders that announce acquisitions of
high-tech targets seem to avoid both Friday and Monday (Regression 2 and 4).
[Table 8 ABOUT HERE]
As expected, FI and FAS remain statistically significant predictors of lower probability
that managers announce deals on Friday even after controlling for high-volatility bidders and
high-tech targets (see Regressions 1-4, Table 9). Furthermore, FI and FAS predict a higher
probability that managers choose Monday instead of Friday in the subsample of Monday and
Friday announcements even in the presence of the additional two control variables (Regressions
5-8).
[Table 9 ABOUT HERE]
Additionally, in the unreported analysis I investigate whether media coverage of M&As
is higher on Monday. Getting more space on the media might induce managers to favor this
day of the week for deal announcements. I measure media coverage by the number of news
articles. The analysis reveals no evidence that Monday offers any benefit.
Finally, I check whether the managerial optimistic (pessimistic) perception of a deal is
correlated with Monday (Friday) announcements. The announcement timing conjecture pre-
dicts that managers that are optimistic about a deal are likely to avoid Friday pitfalls and an-
nounce it on the following Monday, while we should observe the opposite for less optimistic
ones. In the unreported analysis I model the deal completion probability using the Monday and
Friday dummies as the main explanatory variables. I also include the standard set of controls in
the regressions. I find that the Monday (Friday) dummy indeed predicts a higher (lower) com-
pletion probability in the full sample. Also, Monday deals are more likely to get completed
than those announced on Friday. This analysis confirms the conjecture that the managers’ per-
ception of deal quality determines their strategic decisions. In the other words, managers that
are more optimistic about their deals avoid Friday pitfalls, while those less optimistic actually
do the opposite – they try to exploit the Friday inattention.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated whether managers time acquisition announcements, what
drives such behavior, and whether their strategic moves pay off. To test this conjecture I ex-
ploited a sharp variation in the number of deals around weekends – an unusually high number
of deals on Monday (also known as Merger Monday) and a relatively low percentage of an-
nouncements on Fridays. I have found evidence consistent with managers timing their M&A
announcements in order to anticipate and avoid potential pitfalls, specifically, investor inat-
tention and the possibility that Friday announcements are interpreted as bad news. I have
also documented significant gains when managers attempted to avoid Friday investor attention.
However, there was no similar effect when the decisive factor was the possibility that the mar-
ket might interpret the announcement as bad news. I also tested a number of alternative factors
that could explain the day of the week pattern of M&A announcements (deal complexity, infor-
mation leakage, and media coverage). Even though I have found that some of them hold (deal
complexity), the announcement timing hypothesis could not be invalidated.
Overall, the results of this study show that information asymmetry and uncertainty about
deal quality are important concerns in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Managers do
take action to address these issues and avoid misinterpretation of deal qualities. Specifically,
when making a decision about the announcement time they take into account investor behav-
ioral biases (e.g. inattention) and the severity of the adverse selection problem.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The sample consists of acquisitions between
January 1990 and December 2016 with a bidder that is a U.S. public company and a target that is either a subsidiary, a
public or private company. I require that deal and bidder data is available in SDC, CRSP and COMPUSTAT. I collect
transactions with at least a $1 million deal value and are not labeled as recapitalizations, repurchases, self-tenders, or
exchange offers. All dollar amounts are expressed as CPI-adjusted December 2016 U.S. dollars. Continuous variables are
winsorized at the 0.25th and 99.75th percentile. CAR is the bidder cumulative abnormal return estimated using the Carhart
four factor model over days -280 to -31 and CAV is the bidder cumulative abnormal trading volume. Cash indicates that
the acquisition is financed with cash only. Competition, Completed and Cross-border are dummies indicating multiple
bidders, completed acquisitions and foreign acquisitions, respectively. Deal size is the total value of the transaction as
reported by SDC. Defense indicates that the target employs a defensive tactic to countervail a takeover attempt. FI is the
pre-announcement proxy of Friday inattention. FAS is the pre-announcement proxy of the adverse selection problem.
High volatility indicates bidders with above average stock price volatility, while High-tech indicates targets operating in
the high-tech industries. Friendly is a dummy equal to one if the attitude of the target management is friendly. Market cap
is the bidder firm market capitalization at the last fiscal year end before the acquisition announcement. Market-to-book
is the bidder firm market to book ratio at the last fiscal year end before the acquisition announcement. Private and Public
indicate a target that is a private or publicly traded firm, respectively. Relative size is the deal value to bidder market
capitalization ratio. ROA is the bidder firm return on assets from the last fiscal year before the acquisition announcement.
Same industry indicates that the bidder and the target are in the same 2-digit SIC industry. Subsidiary indicates a target
that is a subsidiary. Target advisors is the number of firms acting as a financial or legal advisor to the target. Target term.
fee indicates that the target is liable to pay a termination fee to the acquirer. Tender offer indicates a deal that is structured
as a tender offer. The detailed description of the variables is provided in Table A.1.
Monday & Friday Monday Friday
Mean Median St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean Mean Diff.
CAR(-1,1) [%] 1.10 0.33 8.73 1.07 8.52 1.06 1.10 -0.038
Cash 0.29 0 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.28 0.023∗∗∗
Competition 0.016 0 0.13 0.020 0.14 0.023 0.016 0.0069∗∗∗
Completed 0.89 1 0.32 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.88 0.021∗∗∗
Cross-border 0.18 0 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.19 -0.013∗∗
Deal size [$ m] 498.6 60.0 2111.4 588.3 2393.0 696.5 399.4 297.1∗∗∗
Defense 0.028 0 0.17 0.032 0.18 0.034 0.028 0.0065∗∗
FI 0.0084 0.0073 0.20 0.0075 0.19 0.010 0.0023 0.0081∗∗
FAS 0.92 1 0.19 0.92 0.19 0.92 0.90 0.019∗∗∗
Friendly 0.97 1 0.17 0.97 0.18 0.97 0.96 0.011∗∗∗
High volatility 0.50 0 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 -0.016∗
High-tech 0.26 0 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.23 0.032∗∗∗
Market cap [$ m] 10007.7 823.4 35715.9 10287.2 35711.3 10284.1 10292.6 -8.50
Market-to-book 3.51 2.28 7.56 3.46 7.43 3.57 3.26 0.31∗∗
Private 0.47 0 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.46 -0.0031
Public 0.21 0 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.22 0.011
Relative size 0.38 0.089 1.06 0.39 1.04 0.40 0.37 0.030∗
ROA [%] 8.64 10.9 17.4 9.04 17.2 9.40 8.41 0.99∗∗∗
Same industry 0.40 0 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.40 -0.015∗
Subsidiary 0.31 0 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.32 -0.0077
Target advisors 0.93 0 1.31 0.98 1.36 1.08 0.81 0.27∗∗∗
Target term. fee 0.11 0 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.085 0.049∗∗∗
Tender offer 0.033 0 0.18 0.038 0.19 0.042 0.030 0.012∗∗∗
Observations 37635 14821 9426 5395 14821
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01 32
Table 2: M&A distribution by the day of the week
This table reports the frequency (Count) and percentage (Observed [%]) of M&A announcements by the day of the
week. It also reports the results of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test for the deal percentage against the uniform
distribution. The percentage is calculated as the weekday number of M&As relative to the total number of deals
announced. The table reports statistics for the full sample and public-to-public versus private-to-private deals.
Public-to-public deals are a subsample of the full sample, while private-to-private deals are extracted from the
control sample. The full sample consists of acquisitions announced between January 1990 and December 2016
with a U.S. bidder that is a publicly traded company and a target that is either a subsidiary, a public or private
company. The control sample contains deals with private U.S. bidders only.
Full sample Pub. bidder & Pub. target Priv. bidder & Priv. target
Expected [%] Count Observed [%] Count Observed [%] Count Observed [%]
Monday 20 9,426 25.1 2,609 27.0 1,254 20.5
Tuesday 20 7,876 20.9 1,915 19.8 1,240 20.3
Wednesday 20 7,515 20.0 1,882 19.5 1,265 20.7
Thursday 20 7,423 19.7 1,861 19.2 1,193 19.5
Friday 20 5,395 14.3 1,410 14.6 1,156 18.9
Observations 37,635 9,677 6,108
χ2 1,100.6 373.4 6.9
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.141
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Table 3: Friday investor inattention and Friday/Monday M&A announcements
The table reports the results of logistic regressions that estimate the propensity for bidders to announce a deal on
Friday and Monday. The first two regressions estimate the propensity of Friday announcements in the full sample,
while the latter two model the likelihood that managers announce deals on Monday instead of Friday. The main
explanatory variable is the ex-ante measure of investor inattention. The detailed description of the variables is
provided in Table A.1. The sample consists of acquisitions between January 1990 and December 2016 with a
bidder that is a U.S. public company and a target that is either a subsidiary, a public or private company. The
main explanatory variable (FI) and the continuous control variables (deal size, the bidder market cap, market-to-
book ratio, and ROA) are winsorized at the 0.25th and 99.75th percentile. The standard errors are clustered by the
announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
All weekdays Monday vs. Friday
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Friday Friday Monday Monday
FI -0.213∗∗ -0.207∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.085) (0.097) (0.098)
ln(Deal size) -0.084∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014)
ln(Market cap) 0.029∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
Market-to-book -0.004∗∗ 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002)
ROA [%] -0.000 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Cash -0.019 0.052
(0.034) (0.042)
Public 0.029 -0.076
(0.034) (0.054)
Competition 0.025 0.189
(0.138) (0.200)
Cross-border 0.045 -0.122∗∗
(0.048) (0.058)
Defense -0.037 0.207
(0.129) (0.147)
Friendly -0.247∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.098)
Same industry 0.005 -0.016
(0.036) (0.042)
Tender offer -0.076 0.191
(0.077) (0.136)
Constant -0.831∗∗ -0.581 -0.347 -0.723
(0.330) (0.356) (0.436) (0.452)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Observations 37624 37462 14813 14756
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4: Concern about Friday adverse selection and Friday/Monday M&A announce-
ments
The table reports the results of logistic regressions that estimate the propensity for bidders to announce a deal on
Friday and Monday. The first two regressions estimate the propensity of Friday announcements in the full sample,
while the latter two model the likelihood that managers announce deals on Monday instead of Friday. The main
explanatory variable is the ex-ante measure of the anticipated adverse selection problem (FAS), i.e. the managers’
concern that investors might misinterpret the deal quality. The detailed description of the variables is provided in
Table A.1. The sample consists of acquisitions between January 1990 and December 2016 with a bidder that is a
U.S. public company and a target that is either a subsidiary, a public or private company. The main explanatory
variable (FAS) and the continuous control variables (deal size, the bidder market cap, market-to-book ratio, and
ROA) are winsorized at the 0.25th and 99.75th percentile. The standard errors are clustered by the announcement
year and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
All weekdays Monday vs. Friday
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Friday Friday Monday Monday
FAS -0.301∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.086) (0.078) (0.080)
ln(Deal size) -0.084∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.015)
ln(Market cap) 0.043∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013)
Market-to-book -0.006∗∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
ROA [%] 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Cash 0.002 0.014
(0.036) (0.042)
Public 0.034 -0.069
(0.034) (0.056)
Competition 0.074 0.170
(0.144) (0.202)
Cross-border 0.056 -0.116∗∗
(0.045) (0.057)
Defense -0.039 0.211
(0.129) (0.155)
Friendly -0.246∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.096)
Same industry -0.031 0.000
(0.048) (0.055)
Tender offer -0.078 0.157
(0.074) (0.123)
Constant -0.514 -0.337 -0.723 -1.040∗
(0.439) (0.456) (0.576) (0.588)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Observations 31021 30976 12213 12194
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01 35
Table 5: Announcement timing returns
This table reports the OLS regression results for the bidder 3-day event period abnormal stock returns (CAR).
It is calculated using the Carhart four-factor model with the parameters estimated over days [-280, -31]. The
main explanatory variables are the ex-ante measure of investor inattention (FI) and the ex-ante measure of the
anticipated adverse selection problem (FAS), i.e. the managers’ concern that investors might misinterpret the deal
quality. The detailed description of the variables is provided in Table A.1. The sample consists of acquisitions
between January 1990 and December 2016 with a bidder that is a U.S. public company and a target that is either a
subsidiary, a public or private company. The main explanatory variables (FI and FAS) and the continuous control
variables (deal size, the bidder market cap, market-to-book ratio, and ROA) are winsorized at the 0.25th and 99.75th
percentile. The standard errors are clustered by the announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR(-1,1) [%] CAR(-1,1) [%] CAR(-1,1) [%] CAR(-1,1) [%]
Monday -0.033 -0.056 -0.565 -0.539
(0.164) (0.167) (0.696) (0.698)
FI -0.190 -0.629
(0.502) (0.468)
Monday × FI 2.108∗∗∗ 1.651∗∗
(0.696) (0.791)
FAS -0.219 -0.195
(0.706) (0.707)
Monday × FAS 0.503 0.461
(0.722) (0.727)
Constant 2.897 2.907 0.567 0.570
(2.274) (2.260) (2.795) (2.794)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Observations 14764 14764 12199 12199
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
36
Table 6: Deal complexity
This table reports the results of logistic regressions that estimate the propensity for the bidder to announce an
acquisition on Monday. The main explanatory variables, which are proxies for deal complexity, are deal size, the
number of target advisors and the indicator equal to one when the target is liable to pay a termination fee to the
acquirer. The detailed description of the variables is provided in Table A.1. The sample consists of acquisitions
between January 1990 and December 2016 with a bidder that is a U.S. public company and a target that is either
a subsidiary, a public or private company. The main explanatory variables and the continuous control variables
(the bidder market cap, market-to-book ratio, and ROA) are winsorized at the 0.25th and 99.75th percentile. The
standard errors are clustered by the announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monday Monday Monday Monday
ln(Deal size) 0.099∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014)
Target advisors 0.093∗∗∗ 0.025∗
(0.012) (0.013)
Target term. fee 0.370∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.054)
Constant -1.534∗∗∗ -1.451∗∗∗ -1.439∗∗∗ -1.413∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.317) (0.316) (0.319)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Observations 37459 37459 37459 37459
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 8: Information leakage
This table reports the results of logistic regressions that estimate the propensity for the bidder to announce an
acquisition on Monday and Friday. The main explanatory variables, which are proxies for the sensitivity to
information leakage, are the indicator of bidders with above average stock price volatility and the indicator of
targets that operate in the high-tech industries. The detailed description of the variables is provided in Table A.1.
The sample consists of acquisitions between January 1990 and December 2016 with a bidder that is a U.S. public
company and a target that is either a subsidiary, a public or private company. The main explanatory variables and
the continuous control variables (deal size, the bidder market cap, market-to-book ratio, and ROA) are winsorized
at the 0.25th and 99.75th percentile. The standard errors are clustered by the announcement year and are robust to
heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monday Monday Friday Friday
High volatility -0.050∗ 0.068∗
(0.029) (0.037)
High-tech -0.080∗∗ -0.125∗∗
(0.036) (0.056)
Constant -1.540∗∗∗ -1.541∗∗∗ -0.573 -0.589∗
(0.333) (0.330) (0.355) (0.354)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Observations 37459 37459 37462 37462
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 9: Information leakage and announcement timing
The table reports results of logistic regressions that estimate the propensity for bidders to announce a deal on
Friday and Monday when controlling for information leakage. The first four regressions estimate the propensity
of Friday announcements in the full sample, while the latter four model the likelihood that managers announce
deals on Monday instead of Friday. The main explanatory variables are the ex-ante measure of investor inattention
(FI) and the ex-ante measure of the anticipated adverse selection problem (FAS), i.e. the managers’ concern that
investors might misinterpret the deal quality. The regressions also include measures of sensitivity to information
leakage: the indicator of bidders with above average stock price volatility and the indicator of targets that operate
in the high-tech industries. The detailed description of the variables is provided in Table A.1. The sample consists
of acquisitions between January 1990 and December 2016 with a bidder that is a U.S. public company and a target
that is either a subsidiary, a public or private company. The main explanatory variables and the continuous control
variables (deal size, the bidder market cap, market-to-book ratio, and ROA) are winsorized at the 0.25th and 99.75th
percentile. The standard errors are clustered by the announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
All weekdays Monday vs. Friday
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Friday Friday Friday Friday Monday Monday Monday Monday
FI -0.211∗∗ -0.208∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.085) (0.098) (0.098)
FAS -0.314∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.085) (0.081) (0.080)
High volatility 0.070∗ 0.061 -0.101∗∗ -0.095∗
(0.037) (0.040) (0.051) (0.054)
High-tech -0.125∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ 0.061 0.098
(0.056) (0.055) (0.064) (0.061)
Constant -0.575 -0.592∗ -0.338 -0.360 -0.737 -0.718 -1.050∗ -1.027∗
(0.356) (0.355) (0.459) (0.454) (0.456) (0.451) (0.595) (0.587)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Observations 37462 37462 30976 30976 14756 14756 12194 12194
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Figure 1: M&A distribution by the day of the week
This figure plots the percentage of M&A announcements by the day of the week. The percentage is calculated as
the weekday number of M&As relative to the total number of deals announced. The figure plots the percentage for
the full sample (Figure 1a) and public-to-public versus private-to-private deals (Figure 1b). Public-to-public deals
are a subsample of the full sample, while private-to-private deals are extracted from the control sample. The full
sample consists of acquisitions announced between January 1990 and December 2016 with a U.S. bidder that is a
publicly traded company and a target that is either a subsidiary, a public or private company. The control sample
contains only deals with a private U.S. bidder.
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Appendix
A Variable definitions
Table A.1: Variable definitions and sources
This table defines variables used in the analysis. They are obtained directly from or constructed using
Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S and SDC.
Variable Definition Source
CAR(-1,1) Cumulative abnormal returns (in %) for the bidder firm from day -1 to day
1 calculated using the Carhart four-factor model. Model parameters are esti-
mated over days [-280, -31].
CRSP
Cash 1 for deals financed with cash only. SDC
Competition 1 when there is more than one bidder. SDC
Completed 1 for completed acquisitions. SDC
Cross-border 1 when the bidder and the target are not from the same country. SDC
Deal size Total value of the transaction (millions of US $). SDC
Defense 1 if the target employs a defensive tactic to countervail a takeover attempt. SDC
FAS Pre-announcement proxy of the severity of adverse selection, i.e. the man-
agers’ concern that the market might interpret Friday announcements as bad
news. It is defined as one minus the ratio of the number of quarterly EAs
over a 3-year period before the M&A announcement that beat the analyst
consensus forecast and are announced on Friday and the number of all quar-
terly EAs over a 3-year period before the M&A announcement that beat the
analyst consensus forecast.
I/B/E/S
FI Pre-announcement proxy of investor inattention on Friday. It is measured as
a difference between the day of the week average relative trading volumes
on Monday to Tuesday and the average relative trading volume on Friday.
The day of the week average relative trading volumes are calculated over a
one-year period before the announcement.
CRSP
Friday 1 when the acquisition is announced on Friday. SDC
Friendly 1 if attitude of the target management is friendly. SDC
High volatility 1 if the bidder stock price volatility is above the average. CRSP
High-tech 1 when the target operates in the following industries: drugs (SIC codes
2833-2836), research and development services (8731-8734), programming
(7371-7379), computers (3570-3577), and electronics (3600-3674), as in Ba-
ginski et al. (2004).
SDC
Market cap Bidder market capitalization [=Share price (PRCC F) × Number of shares
outstanding (CSHO)] at the last fiscal year end before the acquisition an-
nouncement, in millions of US $.
Compustat
Market-to-book Ratio of the bidder market capitalization to its book value of equity [=To-
tal shareholders’ equity (SEQ) + Deferred taxes and investment tax credits
(TXDITC) - Preferred stock liquidating value (PSTKL)] at the last fiscal year
end before the acquisition announcement.
Compustat
Monday 1 when the acquisition is announced on Monday. SDC
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Private 1 when the target is a private company. SDC
Public 1 when the target is a publicly listed company. SDC
Relative size Ratio of the deal size to the bidder market capitalization at the last fiscal year
end before the acquisition announcement.
Compustat,
SDC
ROA Bidder firm return on assets [EBITDA / Book value of assets (AT)] at the last
fiscal year end before the acquisition announcement, expressed in %.
Compustat
Same industry 1 when the bidder and the target are in the same 2-digit SIC industry. SDC
Subsidiary 1 when the target is a subsidiary. SDC
Target advisors Number of firms acting as a financial or legal advisor to the target. SDC
Target term. fee 1 if the target is liable to pay a termination fee to the acquirer. SDC
Tender offer 1 when the deal is structured as a tender offer. SDC
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B News download
I use the Factiva database to download data on media coverage. I collect news in English with the region set to the
United States, and I filter out identical duplicates. To rule out concerns about the potential impact of the search
method, I collect news following two different procedures. Firstly, I require that the article contains both the exact
name of the bidder and the exact name of the target, as provided by the SDC database.24 Interestingly, SDC often
abbreviates certain words in the long company names. For example, it uses svcs instead of services, expl instead of
exploration, intl instead of international, and so on. When conducting the search, I manually replace these kinds
of abbreviations with the full words. I call this procedure the standard search. In the alternative procedure, I repeat
the search subtracting suffixes indicating the company type from company names, but at the same time I require
that both the bidder name and the target name appear in the first 100 words of the article.25 The subtracted suffixes
are Inc., Corp., Co., LLC, LC and Ltd.. This procedure addresses two possible issues: firstly, journalists might
omit suffixes from company names, and secondly, if the transaction parties are not mentioned at the beginning of
an article, then it is likely that the article itself does not talk about the M&A deal at all. I refer to this procedure as
the no-suffix search. The analysis results are not affected by the choice of download procedure.
24This is fairly simple to perform in Factiva using double quotes together with the and operator, e.g. “ABC
Inc.” and “XYZ Corp.”.
25This is fairly simple to perform in Factiva using double quotes together with the and and /F100/ operators,
e.g. (“ABC” and “XYZ”)/F100/.
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Abstract
Mergers and acquisitions are often motivated by the intention of creating extra value from
intangible assets. We develop a novel word list of intangibles and apply it to the takeover
announcements from 2002 to 2016 with a U.S. domiciled bidder. Deals presented with
more “intangibles talk” in takeover announcements complete more quickly (and more fre-
quently). However, the value of these deals is questionable: One standard deviation more
in intangibles talk results in 0.47 percentage points lower abnormal announcement returns
of bidders. We find no support for agency problems driving these results. Instead, an
analysis of insider trades suggests that intangibles talk reflects managerial overoptimism.
Overall, takeover announcements can be an important source of information regarding the
quality of deals.
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1 Introduction
On July 20, 2011, Minnesota-based Ecolab Inc., a cleaning and sanitizing products producer,
announced an acquisition of Nalco Holding Co., which makes chemicals used in industrial wa-
ter treatment, energy and air applications. The transaction was valued at $8.1 billion, inclusive
of $2.7 billion in Nalco net debt. As the key assets relevant for the deal, Ecolab’s management
listed, in the acquisition announcement, concepts such as innovation, processes, customers,
markets, technology know-how, team and corporate culture. Ecolab’s CEO is cited as stressing
the importance of Nalco’s expertise, services, efficiency, and market.1 This storyline was also
picked up by the business press.2 In short, Ecolab tried hard to convince investors that Nalco
is rich in intangible assets. However, investors were not convinced. The Ecolab stock price
sharply fell and closed at $51.31 on the announcement day, a drop of 7.4% from the previous
day’s closing price. This is substantially larger than the median bidder price reaction to acquisi-
tions of public chemicals companies over the 2002 to 2016 period, which was−1.3%. Ecolab’s
share price recovered mildly the following day, but then drifted down further to end the 10-day
period after the announcement at $49.53, a fall of 10.6%. Despite the negative market reaction,
the deal was completed and Ecolab acquired Nalco.
This paper studies whether this pattern – even if an extreme case – is typical, that is,
whether a seemingly strong use of “intangibles talk” in a takeover announcement indeed usually
goes hand-in-hand with a negative (abnormal) investor reaction to the announcement. We find
that it does. Further tests reveal that this relation is likely due to managerial overconfidence
about deal quality. Agency issues (such as private benefits of managing a larger company)
seem to play a far less pronounced role. Overall, our paper provides new evidence of the role
of corporate communication and managerial motivations in corporate transactions.
Our study is motivated by the great importance of takeovers and the rising relevance
of intangible assets. Takeovers are major corporate actions; they significantly impact the fu-
1Douglas M. Baker, Jr., Ecolab’s Chief Executive Officer commented on the target, saying “Nalco is the
global leader with deep expertise in programs and services to enhance water process efficiency, extend asset
life, and improve their customers’ end products. Nalco’s water and oil and gas services end markets in par-
ticular represent excellent long term growth potential as the world deals with the quality, cost and availability
of those key natural resources. Further, its geographic exposure to high-growth emerging markets offers ter-
rific future potential for the combined companies.” – https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/31462/
000104746911006458/a2204877zex-99_1.htm
2“We’ve long admired Nalco’s capabilities, know-how and management team for years,” said Ecolab Chief
Executive Doug Baker in an interview. – The Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2011.
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ture of the acquiring company. Takeover announcements attract keen attention of investors
and typically cause a considerable change in the current stock price. The literature documents
a sizable variation in abnormal stock returns around the announcement date that ranges from
rather negative to highly positive returns depending predictably on target and deal character-
istics (see Moeller et al., 2004, 2007; Bargeron et al., 2008; Betton et al., 2008; Savor and
Lu, 2009; Officer et al., 2009; Schneider and Spalt, 2017). While the positive market reaction
causes no controversy, negative returns have triggered a wide debate. Two major explanations
have evolved. The first explanation relies on the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976)
and attributes negative returns to distorted managerial objectives (see Jensen, 1986; Morck
et al., 1990; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), such as “empire building” and other private benefits.
The second explanation draws on managerial behavioral biases, in particular overoptimism and
overconfidence (see Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Ferris et al., 2013). Given the
overall importance of takeovers and the scale of their impact on stock prices, it is crucial to
understand whether takeover announcement content delivers valuable information to investors
and whether it potentially discloses the genuine objective of the deal.
A successful acquisition requires a plausible valuation of the deal – but such valuations
are arguably particularly challenging in the presence of intangible assets. Intriguingly, Lev
(2012) documents a decline of 50% in the ability of accounting data to explain share price
differences across companies over 1975-2006. Casual observation also suggests that acquirers
often refer to intangible assets in takeover announcements. This paper analyzes what market
participants can and do infer from this intangibles talk. Are frequent references to intangibles
just inconsequential managerial guff? Or do such references indeed reveal something about the
deal over and above other observables?
To enable a systematic analysis, we begin by developing a word list to measure the
extent of intangibles talk on takeover announcements. Drawing on the strategy and business
literature (Hall, 1992; Lev, 2005, 2012), we compile a dictionary of 213 words that indicate
intangible assets. For example, each of the words highlighted in Ecolab’s takeover announce-
ment above is on that list. “Intangibles talk” then is the frequency of words associated with
intangible assets.
Between 2002 and 2016, the median (average) U.S. takeover announcement contains
about 2.3% (2.4%) words that are closely related to intangible assets, though there is substan-
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tial variation in that frequency across announcements. That variability enables this analysis.
Ecolab’s announcement has 2.3%, what is considerably larger than the median of 1.3% for
acquisitions of public targets that operate in the chemicals industry.
The main determinants of intangibles talk are the target industry, deal size, and pub-
lic/private status. Strikingly, intangibles talk is not related to the actual size of target intangible
capital (measured in different ways) in the subsample of publicly listed targets. Managerial
skill and background are not systematically related to intangibles talk.
Next, we examine whether bidders that talk more about intangible assets are more likely
to complete the deal. We find that they are: The propensity to complete the acquisition is larger
for deals announced with more intangibles talk, and these deals complete more quickly. This
result holds controlling for many deal characteristics. Thus, managers using intangibles talk in
announcements seem particularly determined to see through the announced deal.
It is possible that managers refer more frequently to intangibles when they are disclosing
advantageous private information regarding the target intangible capital, rather than merely
repeating the visible. It would then be understandable that managers are keen to complete the
deal. The data reject this idea. On average, the market reacts negatively to intangibles talk
in the takeover announcements. One standard deviation more intangibles talk results in 0.47
percentage points lower abnormal announcement returns. There is no noticeable reversal of
this effect; after 30 days, abnormal returns are 0.74 percentage points lower. Intangibles talk
also (weakly) predicts a decrease in the operating performance measured by a change in return
on assets over the next year. Additionally, analysts decrease bidder stock recommendations
following takeover announcements rich in intangibles talk.
Why does the market react negatively to intangibles talk? We find no clear evidence
that intangibles talk reflects an underlying agency problem between managers and sharehold-
ers: For example, the market responds similarly to intangibles talk whether or not the bidder
executive team has strong incentives to increase the share price, or whether or not institutional
investors own an important stake in the bidder. By contrast, we find more convincing evi-
dence that intangibles talk is linked to overoptimism. Specifically, CEOs and top executives
are more likely to purchase stock when they talk more about intangible assets in the takeover
announcements.
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The results are more pronounced in public firms and in deals involving non-high-tech
targets. These results indicate that investors worry most about intangibles talk when intangible
assets are less likely to play a major role in the acquisition rationale.
Overall, our results suggest that investors should be (and indeed are) careful when as-
sessing an acquirer’s proclamations of the intangible assets involved in a transaction. This is
less so because of nefarious motives of self-interested managers who use managerial guff to
push through value-destroying deals; rather, managers themselves often seem to believe in the
value of deals they describe with intangibles talk.
This paper adds to the fast-growing literature that emphasizes the importance of qual-
itative aspects of corporate and media communication. In the context of takeovers, existing
studies have mostly considered whether textual analysis of media coverage can help predict
how likely a deal is to succeed. Liu and McConnell (2013) find that the probability of aban-
doning a deal after a negative stock price reaction at the announcement is related to the level
and the tone of media attention to the proposed transaction; Buehlmaier and Zechner (2017)
find that media information released on the announcement day contains information not cap-
tured by announcement day stock returns; and Ahern and Sosyura (2014) find that bidders
manage media coverage during the private negotiation phase in stock acquisitions, generating
a short-lived increase in the acquirer’s stock price. Very little work is available on merger an-
nouncements. Kimbrough and Louis (2011) study merger-related disclosure in conference calls
and merger announcements, showing that managers use conference calls to signal information
to the market. They do not study intangibles.
The paper also adds to the literature on managerial backgrounds and behavioral bi-
ases in the context of takeovers, in particular overoptimism and overconfidence. In his semi-
nal work, Roll (1986) offers an explanation of negative takeover announcement returns in the
form of managerial overconfidence, the “hubris hypothesis.” Malmendier and Tate (2008) find
that the probability that a CEO undertakes an acquisition is higher if the CEO is classified
as overconfident. Moreover, overconfident CEOs overpay for target companies and undertake
value-destroying mergers. Ferris et al. (2013) study international M&As and find that CEO
overconfidence helps to explain the number of offers made by a CEO, the frequencies of nondi-
versifying and diversifying acquisitions, and the use of cash to finance a merger deal. Custo´dio
and Metzger (2013) show that when the acquirer’s CEO has experience in the target industry,
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the acquirer’s abnormal announcement returns are higher. Aktas et al. (2016) study acquirer
and target CEO narcissism. We add to this literature by providing further evidence that over-
excited CEOs may engage in value-destroying acquisitions, and that this may be revealed in
the wording of the announcement.
Our paper is also related to growing research emphasizing the importance of intangible
assets in corporate value in general and in corporate takeovers specifically. On the general level,
the perception of firm value has evolved over time from a mostly real asset driven to intangible
based valuation. This is analyzed in particular in the comprehensive work by Lev (2000), Lev
(2005), and Lev (2012), who attributes the rising importance of intangibles to two major fac-
tors: the sharp growth in business competition and the commoditization of physical assets. On
the more specific level of takeovers and R%D, Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) show that an active
acquisition market affects firm incentives to innovate and conduct R&D. Bena and Li (2014)
find that patent portfolios and R&D expenses determine whether a firm will be an acquirer or
a target. They conclude that synergies obtained from combining innovation capabilities are
important drivers of acquisitions. Chen et al. (2018) show that a firm’s propensity to acquire
another firm increases after a competitor wins an innovation award. More broadly on the topic
of intangibles, Lys and Yehuda (2015) find that private takeover targets have significantly more
intangible assets than do public targets. John et al. (2015) and Tate and Yang (2016) study the
role of labor mobility in acquisitions. Li et al. (2017) measure organization capital by capital-
ized selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses and show that it predicts superior
deal performance. Fre´sard et al. (2017) show that localized intangibles explain acquisitions
of foreign targets. No work that we know of has examined bidder communication regarding
intangibles in the deal, and the market reaction to such communication.
Finally, the paper adds to the literature that uses textual analysis to provide insight on
otherwise difficult to capture issues. For example, some work has established textual mea-
sures of financial constraints (Buehlmaier and Whited, 2015; Bodnaruk et al., 2015; Hoberg
and Maksimovic, 2015). Others have used 10-Ks to investigate product market competition
(Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). Moreover, a vast literature has considered linguistic tone (which
we control for); see Loughran and McDonald (2016) for a survey. Our analysis uses textual
analysis to provide a new view on intangibles.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our sample selection and data. In
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particular, it discusses the textual analysis methodology and introduces the intangibles words
dictionary. Section 3 studies what explains intangibles talk. Section 4 presents empirical results
for how intangibles talk predicts deal completion probability and speed, abnormal returns, and
post-merger performance, and an analysis of which factors may contribute to the observed
outcomes. It also offers a battery of robustness checks Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Deals and takeover announcements
Our data set is composed of corporate takeover deals from 2002 to 2016, collected from SDC
and matched to CRSP and COMPUSTAT data. We begin by downloading all announced ac-
quisitions where the bidder is a public company domiciled in the United States, and where the
target is a public or private company.3 Following Moeller et al. (2004), we collect transactions
with at least $1 million deal value and 1% relative size (deal value to bidder market capital-
ization ratio). We exclude deals that are labeled as recapitalizations, repurchases, self-tenders,
or exchange offers, as in Bargeron et al. (2008). We require that the bidder owns at least 80%
of the target after the purchase in case of completed deals, and not more than 15% before the
announcement (Schneider and Spalt, 2017). Following standard practice in the literature, we
exclude from the sample bidders that operate in regulated utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) or in
the financial industry (SIC code 6000-6999) and bidders with negative book equity. We fur-
ther require each bidder to match on the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. We require that
annual financial data for the calculation of the control variables (see below) are available in
COMPUSTAT for each bidder. We extract data for the most recent annual report that is filed
not more than a year before the announcement. The sample that we get consists of 4,682 deals.
The corresponding takeover announcements, filed as 8-K forms, are then downloaded
from the EDGAR platform, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system,
which performs automated collection and distribution of data and public filings by companies
3Bidders that are labeled as government, investor, joint venture, mutually owned, subsidiary, private, or have
unknown public status are excluded from the sample. The same list of restrictions applies to targets except for
private status.
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and others who are required by law to file forms with the SEC. Public companies must file an
8-K form with the SEC within four business days to announce material events that shareholders
should know about. Form 8-K is a “current report.” It is not filed in the regular time intervals,
but is triggered by a significant event like a CEO departure or an M&A. Only 8-Ks filed no
later than 4 business days after the announcement date of the deal are used in the analysis.4
The final takeover sample consists of 2,414 deals.
We obtain additional data needed for hypothesis testing from several databases. Man-
agerial incentives, computed as in Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006) are from
Lalitha Naveen’s website. Institutional investor (13F) stock holdings are downloaded from
Thomson Reuters. Insider trading data are from Thomson Reuters Insider Filings. Analyst
stock buy-sell recommendations are from I/B/E/S (Recommendations - Summary Statistics
section). Managerial skill data as in Demerjian et al. (2012) is from Peter Demerjian’s web-
site.5
2.2 Textual analysis of takeover announcements
2.2.1 8-K parsing
When analyzing the announcements we follow a common practice in the textual analysis liter-
ature, a “bag of words” approach. This approach is based on parsing announcement files into
vectors of words and word counts. We exclude footers as they commonly contain template
language that is not useful in measuring text variables of interest. As a footer starting point we
take the forward-looking disclaimer. We split words by space and delete all leading and trailing
non-alphabetical characters using regular expressions. This procedure automatically removes
numbers. Finally, the parsed text is matched to dictionaries to obtain word frequencies.
4The download and announcement identification procedure is described in Supplementary Appendix Sec-
tion C.1. EDGAR and SDC do not have a linking identifier. SDC, however, provides 6-digit CUSIPs that can
be used to link SDC to CRSP to obtain PERMNOs, which in turn provide a link to COMPUSTAT, which gives
us CIK codes. These CIK codes can be used to download 8-K filings that contain announcements from EDGAR.
There are 62 deals with a missing CIK in the sample. We find the missing identifiers in EDGAR using the bidder
name reported by SDC.
5We use the 2016 version of these data to maximize the coverage, but the results also hold with the prior
vintage (which covers fewer years and uses a different method).
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2.2.2 Intangibles talk dictionary
Our focus is to evaluate the effect of what bidder executives disclose about intangible assets in
takeover announcements. We opt for a simple and replicable approach in this analysis, a word-
counting approach, using a list of relevant words. The extant literature on textual analysis
in finance stresses the importance of using word lists that reflect financial jargon.6 To our
knowledge, there is no such a list for intangibles talk measurement.
To develop our word list, we draw on a number of studies on the role of intangible as-
sets and firm capabilities Hall (1992), Lev (2005) and Lev (2012). These works do not offer
well-defined sets of intangibles words, but they are all rich in describing and listing various
types of these assets. Hall (1992), for example, lists trade marks, patents, copyright, registered
designs, contracts, trade secrets, reputation, networks, know-how, and culture as general intan-
gible categories. He explains that the analysis of intangible assets should play a major role in
the strategic management process and highlights the link between competitive advantage, capa-
bility differentials and intangible resources. Lev (2005) lists general categories and points out
growing importance of intangibles assets. Lev (2012) puts an emphasis on voluntary disclosure
about intangibles to address the shrinking relevance of accounting information.
The list we compile contains 213 words and phrases in total; Table 1. This list includes
the words and phrases that identify or describe intangibles found in one of the above-cited
works. Following Loughran and McDonald (2011), we add the plural form of nouns, the simple
past tense, the past participle, gerund and the third person present tense for verbs.7 For example,
once we include word patent, we add patents, patented and patenting as well. Furthermore, we
add words that are either synonyms or have a very similar meaning in the financial jargon as the
words from the studies, for instance, we accompany word networks with alliances, relations,
relationships and connections.
We did not reverse engineer or “optimize” the word list. Indeed, we will see below
that while by and large our word list gives plausible results in a cross-industry comparison,
there are also some weaknesses. Future work may profitably adjust the list. We also recognize
6See Loughran and McDonald (2016).
7Adverbs and adjectives are not included. However, we find qualitatively similar results even if we include
them in the word list.
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that more sophisticated methods, such as machine learning, may do a superior job at capturing
intangibles talk.
[Table 1 ABOUT HERE]
Loughran and McDonald (2016) suggest to check word frequency when constructing
a dictionary since words tend to follow a power law distribution – a distribution that features
a small number of high–frequency words and a large number of low-frequency words. This
phenomenon is known as Zipf’s law and it raises concerns that certain words can potentially
have a large impact on the results. The word frequencies in Figure 1 seem to be intuitive and
show no signs of obvious misclassification. The 3 most frequent intangibles words (1% of
words from our list), services, solutions, and customers, account for 17% of the intangibles
word count across all acquisition announcements in the sample (21% when also counting their
singulars). This is significantly smaller than the 44% that Loughran and McDonald (2016) find
for the top 1% of negative words in the sample of 10-K/Q filings.
[Figure 1 ABOUT HERE]
We use the standard approach of proportional weighting, that is word list counts divided
by the total number of words in the analyzed text. Accordingly, we define % Intangibles talk
as the number of intangibles words divided by the total number of words in announcement i,
expressed as a percentage:
%Intangibles talki =
Intangibles wordsi
Total wordsi
·100. (1)
2.2.3 Other textual variables
We expect announcements to be fairly positive and definitive overall, but there may still be
informative variation across announcements. % Uncertainty and % Strong modal variables are
the percentages of uncertain and strong modal words from the Loughran and McDonald (2016)
word list, respectively. We also measure the linguistic tone of the announcement. Although
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Loughran and McDonald (2016) caution against the use of positive words, we are here specif-
ically interested in whether companies may “hype” a transaction by using a high number of
positive words, and whether the market sees through them. Negative words may be interpreted
as reflecting a degree of cautiousness. We thus define (net) Negativity of announcement i as:
Negativityi =
Negative wordsi−Positive wordsi
Negative wordsi +Positive wordsi +1
. (2)
In the robustness checks, we also use positive and negative frequencies separately, with
identical inferences. There, we also use other textual variables, such as sentence length.
2.3 Main deal and firm variables
Table 2 defines all variables. Our main dependent variables are an indicator for whether the
acquisition was completed; the days to completion; the announcement return and the medium-
term return; the change in operating performance of the combined entity one to three years
after the transaction; analyst responses; and insider trades. These variables are standard (but
we describe them in more detail below as we go through the analysis).
[Table 2 ABOUT HERE]
Our controls for bidder, target and deal characteristics are also standard. The set of bid-
der control variables include market-to-book ratio, market capitalization and return on assets
(ROA). The main target control variables are its public status, deal relative size, defined as deal
size over bidder market capitalization, and intangible assets. As deal characteristics we use
payment method, tender offer, cross-industry, multiple bidder, cross-border, and friendly deal
dummies. Cross-industry deals involve targets with a two-digit SIC code other than that of the
bidder. When we analyze deal completion probability, we include two additional dummy vari-
ables, indicating the existence of target termination fees and acquirer termination fees. Addi-
tionally, we include year and industry fixed effects in all regression specifications to control for
common time trends and unobservable industry heterogeneity. All continuous control variables
(ROA, market-to-book ratio, market capitalization, relative size, deal size, intangible assets and
their relative size) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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We will begin the analysis by testing whether bidder management talks more about
intangibles when the target has more intangible assets. Measuring those assets directly is chal-
lenging, and we use three proxies (all of which are only available for public targets). For each
of them, we use the log value as well as the ratio of target intangible assets to the book value of
target total assets (IA/AT).
First, a basic measure is the book value of intangible assets (Intan. assetsb), which
is available in COMPUSTAT. The book value of intangible assets does not fully reflect their
real size as accounting systems generally do not keep track of internally generated intangible
assets.8 Second, we compute target intangible assets as deal size minus tangible assets, which
in turn are calculated as total assets minus the book value of intangible assets. The constructed
variable (Intan. assetsacq) essentially quantifies the bidder’s estimate of the target intangible
assets. The advantage of this measure is that it uses current information and captures internally
generated intangibles, but it has the disadvantage that, apart from target intangible assets, it also
captures synergies and possible over- or underpayment. The third measure of intangible assets
(Intan. assetsPT) is the estimated replacement cost of the target’s intangible capital introduced
in Peters and Taylor (2017). These authors recognize that the major part of intangibles arise
from expensed activities, for example, a firm’s spending to develop knowledge, patents, and
software, advertising to build brand capital or employee training to build human capital. They,
therefore, define intangible assets as the sum of the firm’s externally purchased and internally
created intangible capital. Externally purchased intangible capital is measured as the book
value of intangible assets. Internally created intangible capital is computed as the sum of the
replacement cost of the firm’s knowledge capital, which is the portion of intangible capital that
comes from R&D, and the replacement cost of the firm’s organization capital, the portion of
intangible capital that comes from SG&A. The Peters and Taylor (2017) measure is available
in WRDS.
8Under U.S. GAAP, ASC 350-20-25-3 states, “Costs of internally developing, maintaining, or restoring in-
tangible assets (including goodwill) that are not specifically identifiable, that have indeterminate lives, or that are
inherent in a continuing business and related to an entity as a whole, shall be recognized as an expense when
incurred.” – https://www.fasb.org/resources/ccurl/731/820/fas142.pdf
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2.4 Summary statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics. On average, 2.38% of takeover announcements’ words are
from the intangibles words list, with substantial variation across announcements. The distribu-
tion is not heavily skewed, as also seen in the the median value of 2.29%. (We study industry
variation, time trends, and other determinants of intangibles talk below.)
Not surprisingly, the announcements are dominated by positive words (1.40%) relative
to negative words (0.34%), resulting in average negativity of -0.55. Words that might carry
a negative message, such as strong modal and uncertainty words, are not so frequent either,
0.19% and 0.42% respectively.9
[Table 3 ABOUT HERE]
The sample has a positive event period bidder cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of
0.39% on average (0.22% median CAR). As is usual, in public deals, bidders have significantly
negative returns on average (−1.36%), in contrast to what happens in private deals (1.15%).10
The target CAR is significantly larger, with a mean (median) value of 25.1% (20.8%). 11 In our
sample, 93% of deals are completed, which is somewhat more than is typically the case.12 The
average (median) time from the announcement to the deal completion is about 54 (34) days.
The average abnormal increase in operating performance (∆ROA) is 1.02% over one year and
0.81% over three years following the acquisition.
The size of target intangible assets varies substantially depending on the measure we
use. The book value is the smallest, followed by the Peters and Taylor (2017) measure, and the
9These numbers can be compared to average negativity (as defined here), strong modal word usage, and un-
certainty of -0.38, 0.63%, and 0.84%, respectively, on earnings conference calls (Druz et al., 2018).
10Moeller et al. (2004) report average bidder CARs of 1.496% for private deals and −1.022% for public deals.
In a more recent study, Schneider and Spalt (2017) compute bidder CARs of 1.44% for non-public and −1.39%
for private deals, respectively.
11Similarly, Bargeron et al. (2008) find that shareholders of firms acquired by public firms gain 29.5% on
average over the 3 days around the announcement of the acquisition.
12For the 1979–2003 period, Officer (2007) reports that 95% of 2,829 offers in SDC for unlisted stand-alone
targets for are successful versus 77% of 4,559 offers for publicly traded targets. This combines to an 84% overall
completion rate. In our sample, 96% of 1,736 offers for private targets and 88% of 740 offers for publicly traded
targets are completed. The difference between the full sample statistics can, therefore, be attributed to the relatively
higher proportion of private targets and the higher completion rate of public target deals in our sample. The latter
is likely due to relatively smaller number of hostile deals in our sample, which were more common during the
“corporate raiders” era in the 1980s.
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measure that proxies for the size of acquired intangibles using actual deal size.13
3 Which announcements feature intangibles talk?
We begin our analysis by analyzing intangibles talk over time, across industries, and across
deals. Figure 2 plots the time series of intangibles talk in the full sample and for private and
public target deal announcements separately. There is little discernible variation in intangibles
talk over time, though there does appear to exist a modest downward trend over time, partic-
ularly among public deals (which exhibit significantly less intangibles talk, as detailed further
below).
Next, Figure 3 shows, as expected, that how much the bidder management talks about
intangibles depends on the industry sector in which the target operates in.14 For example, the
highest intangibles talk industries among the Fama-French 48 industries, Business services,
Computers, and Electrical equipment are nearly three times richer in intangibles talk than the
lowest three, Precious metals, Restaurants, hotels, motels, and Petroleum and natural gas. The
later three indeed heavily rely on tangible assets in contrast to the ones at the top of the intan-
gibles talk list which are technology intensive industries. As such, our classification captures
plausible variation. We acknowledge that the classification is not perfect. For example, acqui-
sition announcements in the Pharma industry use relatively few of our intangibles words, even
though one might expect these deals to involve a high percentage of intangibles. Although more
sophisticated and perhaps industry-specific classification methods could yield further insights
here, we continue to use our classification to avoid concerns about data mining.
[Figure 2 ABOUT HERE]
[Figure 3 ABOUT HERE]
13Table SA.1 reports the correlation between the measures of target intangible assets. The correlation coeffi-
cients for the measures of absolute intangible asset size (Panel A) are all positive and significant. The smallest
coefficient (56.3%) is the one between the book value and the estimate of acquired intangibles, and the largest
one is between the book value and the PT measures (81.7%). However, the relative measures (Panel B) are not
significantly correlated, with the exception of the correlation between the ratios using the estimate of acquired
intangibles and the PT measures, which is statistically different from zero, but still small in magnitude (9.3%).
14A quite similar picture arises when using bidder industries.
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Column (1) in Panel A of Table 4 shows that industry and year fixed effects together
explain 21% of the variation in intangibles talk. Which target characteristics explain intangibles
talk? The second regression reveals that deal size and the target public status dummy explain an
additional 10% of the variation (31% in total). Both variables enter negatively and significantly.
This is consistent with the intuition that private and small firms, such as start-ups, more heavily
rely on intangible assets, for example innovation potential.15 Conversely, these regressions
suggest that when an announcement of an acquisition of a public target uses a high frequency
of intangibles words, this is unusual.
In additional checks below, we also examine the role of bidder intangibles. It is possible
that intangibles talk just reflects business model features of the bidder. As we will see, however,
there is no clear pattern: The absolute level of bidder intangibles is related to intangibles talk,
but the level relative to total assets is not. Further checks consider the role of managerial skill.
The robustness section shows that these do not strongly correlate with intangible talk. Because
adding either of these controls reduces the sample size, we do not include them in the main
regressions, but repeat all analysis with them in the robustness analysis in Section 4.4. Neither
controlling for bidder intangible talk nor controlling for managerial ability changes the results.
In additional, untabulated analysis, we also investigate whether deal characteristics cor-
relate with intangibles talk. There is no specific reason why they should, and indeed we do
not find much significant variation. In any case, we control for a range of deal variables in the
further analysis. We also find that takeover announcements with more intangibles talk use more
positive and fewer negative words, as well as more strong modal words. We control for these
linguistic features in what follows.
[Table 4 ABOUT HERE]
In Panel B, we focus on public targets, which offer accounting information not available
for private firms. Specifically, we consider three measures of target intangible assets: the book
value, the estimate of the acquired intangibles, and the estimated replacement cost of target’s
intangibles (Peters and Taylor, 2017). For each measure we compute a natural logarithm of its
15Indeed, Lys and Yehuda (2015) find that private takeover targets have significantly more intangible assets than
do public targets. Moreover, Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) present evidence of a negative relation between firm
size and the innovation process.
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value and ratio to the book value of target total assets. None of specifications yields significant
coefficients.
Overall, these results suggest that while intangibles talk predictably varies with industry
characteristics, on the specific deal-level, the size of target intangible assets do not explain the
use of intangibles talk. This result begs several questions: Is intangibles talk just managerial
guff? If it is, is it disregarded by investors? Or do these results mean that there is new and
valuable information in the announcements? That is, do managers perhaps reveal insights into
the value of a deal that would not be seen in observables? Do investors respond to it? Does the
phrasing of announcements reveal something about management’s eagerness to conclude the
deal? We turn to these questions next.
4 What does intangibles talk reveal?
4.1 Eager bidders and intangibles talk
We begin our analysis of the predictive power of intangibles talk by looking at whether man-
agerial communication in earnings announcements reveals something about the decisiveness
with which management pursues the transaction. Specifically, we hypothesize that, holding the
nature of the deal constant, a bidder management team that is more motivated to acquire the tar-
get talks more about its intangible, soft aspects in the takeover announcement. We call this the
Eager Bidder Hypothesis. We expect to find a significant and positive relation between intangi-
bles talk and variables that proxy for management motivation to acquire the target. The proxies
that we propose are deal completion probability and the amount of time from the announcement
till the completion date, given that the bidder acquires the target. The latter variable is a useful
complement to the former because, after all, most deals do get completed.
[Figure 4 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4 presents graphical evidence in favor of the hypothesis. The completion rate
shows a strong, positive relation with the proportion of intangibles words: In the lowest quin-
tile of intangibles talk, 86% of deals are completed, whereas in the highest quintile, 96% are
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completed. The completion rate increases monotonically over the five quintiles. Strikingly,
the completion time measured in days exhibits almost a linearly decreasing trend across intan-
gibles talk quintiles: In the lowest quintile of intangibles talk, deals take around 100 days to
complete. By contrast, when an announcement is in the highest quintile of intangibles talk,
managers seem to be in a hurry: after less than 50 days, the average deal is completed. Overall,
these patterns provide suggestive evidence that the managerial ambition to acquire the target is
indeed reflected in the frequency of intangibles words.
Of course, it is possible that other factors come into play. For example, acquisitions of
private targets involve more intangibles talk, but these acquisitions are expected to close sub-
stantially faster (given the smaller complexity). To formally test the Eager Bidder Hypothesis
and to explore whether the observed patterns are driven by bidder, target, or deal characteristics,
we estimate the following probit regression:
Pr(Ci = 1) ∝ exp(α+β1ITi +∑
n
βnTVi,n +∑
m
βmCVi,m + Ind +Y r), (3)
where C is a dummy equal to 1 for deals that are completed, IT is intangibles talk, TV are other
textual variables, and CV are deal, bidder and target control variables for deal i.
The second test involves an OLS regression estimated for completed deals only:
DTCi(Ci = 1) = α+β1ITi +∑
n
βnTVi,n +∑
m
βmCVi,m + Ind +Y r, (4)
where DTC is the number of days between the announcement and completion date for deal i.
The other variables remain as in the previous model.
In both models, we include 2-digit SIC bidder industry (Ind) and year (Yr) fixed ef-
fects. We cluster standard errors by the announcement year to capture the correlation between
observations over time.16
[Table 5 ABOUT HERE]
16Alternatively, we cluster standard errors by 2-digit SIC industry. The results remain similar throughout the
entire analysis. Yet alternatively, we use Fama-French 48 industries, with identical inferences. Finally, our results
also remain robust when using industry-year fixed effects (which accounts for the possibility of industry-specific
merger waves, for example).
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Table 5 reports the regression results for the two models. They support the evidence
suggested by Figure 4 above: Specifically, regressions (1) and (2) imply that, even controlling
for a rich set of bidder, target, and deal characteristics, there is a statistically and economically
significant association between the extent of intangibles talk and the completion rate of deals.
A one percentage point difference in intangibles talk implies a 1.3 percentage point increase of
the probability of completion. Similarly, specifications (3) and (4) show that the bidders who
talk more about intangible assets in the announcements complete the deal in a significantly
shorter time period, given that the target is acquired. One percentage point more in intangibles
talk shortens the deal completion period by 4.5 days.
Other textual features of the announcement are also revealing: Even though on average
announcements sound fairly positive, when they are somewhat less positive, this does indicate
a lower completion probability and a more drawn-out process to completion. Uncertain words
and strong modal words both portend a somewhat lower completion rate. The other control
variables largely have signs in line with the existing literature.
Overall, the evidence provides strong support for the Eager Bidder Hypothesis.
4.2 Does intangibles talk describe better deals?
We have found that there is positive and significant relation between intangibles talk in the
takeover announcements and the observed speed and likelihood of completion of the deal. We
consider three potential explanations for this relation: (1) advantageous private information,
(2) agency problems, and (3) overoptimism of bidders. The explanations are not mutually
exclusive ex ante. To distinguish between explanation (1) and the other two, we exploit the
market reaction to the takeover announcement and the actual ex-post performance of bidders.
To distinguish between (2) and (3), we draw on cross-sectional variation in the market reactions
as well as on insider trading choices.
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4.2.1 Does intangibles talk convey advantageous information?
We investigate abnormal returns (around the announcement and in the medium run), operating
performance, and analyst responses after takeover announcements.
Abnormal returns
Bidders emphasizing intangibles in takeover announcements may possess private beneficial in-
formation about the target firm potential. As such, their eagerness to acquire the target would
be well-motivated, and they would be simply referring more frequently to intangible aspects as
they try to communicate this information and their excitement to the shareholders. Thus, this
Advantageous Information Hypothesis predicts more positive bidder announcement returns af-
ter more pronounced intangibles talk. By contrast, both the Agency Hypothesis and the Overop-
timism Hypotheses predict a negative relation. Under the former, managers are exploiting their
power to engage in value-destroying deals; under the letter, managerial hubris leads executives
to embark on poor deals.
We measure bidder announcement returns as CAR(-1,1), the 3-day cumulative abnormal
returns for the bidder firm using the Carhart four-factor model, around the announcement.
Model parameters are estimated over days (-280, -31).17
[Figure 5 ABOUT HERE]
Strikingly, Figure 5 presents a clear, negative relation between bidder abnormal returns
and the frequency of intangibles words. Recall that on average announcement returns are
0.39%. In the top quintile of intangibles talk, announcement returns are roughly 0%, whereas
in the lowest quintile, they are about 1%, a sizable spread around the average returns.
To formally investigate the relation between bidder returns and intangibles talk, we
estimate the following regression:
CARi(−1,1) = α+β1ITi +∑
n
βnTVi,n +∑
m
βmCVi,m + Ind +Y r, (5)
17We use the same interval to estimate the benchmark returns as Schneider and Spalt (2017). They use the
market model instead of the Carhart four-factor model.
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where CAR(-1,1) is the bidder announcement CAR, IT is intangibles talk, TV are other textual
variables, and CV are deal, bidder and target control variables for deal i. Again, we also include
industry (Ind) and year (Yr) fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors by the announcement
year. As before, the results are robust to the use of industry-year fixed effects and industry-year
clustering.
[Table 6 ABOUT HERE]
Table 6 shows that intangibles talk enters negatively and significantly in both specifi-
cations. Consider regression (1), because the standard deviation of intangibles talk is one, the
regression implies that a one standard deviation higher intangibles talk results in 0.47 percent-
age points lower abnormal returns, a sizable difference. This remains largely unchanged when
we control for additional textual variables in column (2).
These effects do not revert. Of course, it gets harder to significantly explain returns
over longer time horizons due to the increased noise. However, as column (3) shows, after 30
days, high-intangibles talks firms still experience a discount in abnormal returns of−0.74% on
average. The point estimate is similar when including other textual variables in column (4).
The control variables have the usual signs. In addition, somewhat surprisingly perhaps,
regression (2) shows that the market does not appear to respond to the linguistic tone, the
uncertainty, and the extent of modal word usage in the takeover announcement.
Overall, these results show that investors respond more negatively to acquisition an-
nouncements with more intangibles talk.
Post-acquisition performance
To assess further whether intangibles talk is related to actual deal quality, we look at the post-
acquisition combined entity performance. We consider Return on Assets (ROA), defined as
EBITDA over assets. We allow for performance to accrue over time as it may take time to
generate value from intangible assets. Therefore, we examine ROA changes from year 0 to
year 1, and from year 0 to year 3, where year 0 is defined as the year of acquisition. We
follow Fre´sard et al. (2017) and address underlying industry trends by contrasting acquirer’s
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performance to that of industry peers. For each acquirer, we construct a portfolio of peers that
do not differ more than 50% in size from the acquirer, operate in the same 2-digit SIC industry,
and are not involved in any acquisition during a six-year period surrounding the transaction.
The benchmark is calculated as a mean performance of each portfolio and then subtracted from
that of the acquirers.
[Table 7 ABOUT HERE]
Table 7 reports the results of cross-sectional regressions for the post-acquisition change
in performance. The regression coefficients of intangibles talk are consistently negative for both
1-year and 3-year period. However, statistical significance is low (and decreases further when
using industry-year fixed effects). Overall, the evidence is broadly consistent with the findings
from the CAR analysis, that is, acquiring firms do not refer to intangibles to communicate
advantageous private information about the target.
Analyst stock recommendations
Do financial analysts respond to the information in takeover announcements? To answer, we
compute the change in the median analyst recommendation and regress it on intangibles talk.
The change is defined as a difference between the earliest available median recommendation
that is calculated within the 7-60 days period after the takeover announcement and the most
recent median recommendation calculated within the 7-60 days period before the takeover
announcement. Thomson Reuters calculates median recommendations by assigning to each
contributing analyst’s recommendation an integer based on the standardized Thomson Reuters
recommendation scale and calculating a real number median. The (inversed) scale is as fol-
lows: 5. Strong Buy, 4. Buy, 3. Hold, 2. Underperform, 1. Sell. Table 8 reports the results
of the test. We find that the intangibles talk coefficients in all specifications are negative and
significant, meaning that takeover announcements rich in intangibles talk are related to the
magnitude of stock recommendation downgrade. Finding even a small effect in such an anal-
ysis is impressive, given that on average analysts are known to be reluctant to downgrade their
recommendations (Conrad et al., 2006; Michaely and Womack, 1999).
[Table 8 ABOUT HERE]
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Summary
Overall, the evidence from each of these dependent variables – stock returns (both immediate
and medium-term), operational performance changes, and analyst recommendation changes –
suggests that the bidder management team does not refer to intangible assets to convey advan-
tageous private information to the investors. Higher levels of intangibles talk in the takeover
announcements are rather a sign of poor managerial decisions leading to the acquisition.
4.2.2 Agency or overoptimism?
The negative market response to the takeover announcements with relatively high level of in-
tangibles talk suggest that the bidder managers are either conflicted and pursue their own ob-
jectives, or that they are overoptimistic about the deal.
Testing for agency problems
Under the Agency Hypothesis, conflicted managers who privately benefit (e.g., through an
empire-building motive) even from value-destroying takeovers refer to intangible aspects in
an attempt to justify the deal and bolster the returns. The hypothesis predicts that the effect of
intangibles talk on deal completion and announcement abnormal returns is stronger for bidders
that have a more pronounced agency problem. To proxy for the extent of the agency problem
we use variables that measure the quality of corporate governance.
We present results for two measures.18 Our first governance measure is executive incen-
tives. Intuitively, executives whose wealth depends more on the share price are better aligned
with shareholder welfare, which should lead them to seek out value-increasing takeovers and
avoid value-destroying deals. A standard measure of executives incentives is “equity delta,” the
dollar change in executive wealth from stock and stock options per percent change of the share
price. Lalitha Naveen provides data of these incentives on her website, computed following
Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006). We sum delta of all disclosed executives to get a
measure of the total management team’s incentives. The data cover firms in ExecuComp, which
18In unreported tests, we use a third measure, the entrenchment index (E-index) of Bebchuk et al. (2008), which
we download from their website. The sample is reduced as their index stops before the end of the sample period.
The inferences from this analysis are the same as those reported in this section.
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cuts our sample approximately in half. The second measure is institutional stock ownership.
The likelihood that managers will announce a low quality takeover decreases with institutional
stock ownership as these investors’ incentives to monitor the managers increase with the stake.
We define a dummy equal to one for firms with below industry-median executive delta, and a
dummy equal to one for firms with below median institutional ownership. Then, we interact
these dummies with intangibles talk.
[Table 9 ABOUT HERE]
The regression results are in Table 9. Panel A presents results for bidder CAR regres-
sions, and Panel B reports probit regressions for deal completion. The interaction coefficients
are insignificant for both governance measures in the analysis of bidder abnormal returns. This
suggests that the market does not assess the relevance of intangibles talk as being conditional
on poor governance in the bidder firm. The results in Panel B suggest that intangibles talk is
less informative about deal completion probability when managers have strong incentives, but
the interaction with institutional ownership is not significant.
Overall, we find no strong evidence in favor of the Agency Hypothesis.
Do managers put their own money where their mouth is?
Next, we analyze the Overoptimism Hypothesis. This hypothesis states that intangibles talk in
the takeover announcements is due to managerial overoptimism about the value of the deal.
Both a higher likelihood of deal completion and the negative market reaction are consistent
with this hypothesis. In order to test whether what managers disclose about intangibles reflects
their own views and, therefore, their optimism about the takeover, we examine insider trading
by CEOs and other top executives.19 Under the Overoptimism Hypothesis, we expect to observe
bidder executives to increase their stock holdings. We also analyze trading behavior of board
members who do not hold an executive position. We expect CEOs and other executives to
display more optimism in their actions than other board members, since in most cases it is the
executives who initiate the takeover.
19The top executives group include following roles: CFO (Chief Financial Officer), COO (Chief Operating
Officer), CIO (Chief Investment Officer) and CTO (Chief Technology Officer).
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Following Chung et al. (2018), we construct a trading window for each announcement
that begins 2 days after the announcement and ends 60 days after the announcement or the
effective day if it comes first. We assign a positive sign to buy and negative to sell transactions,
and then compute the total number of shares traded for each group. A group is labeled as a
net buyer if the total number of shares traded over the analyzed window is positive, i.e., if the
number of shares purchased exceeds the number of shares sold.
[Table 10 ABOUT HERE]
Table 10 reports the results of probit regressions that measure the propensity for the
bidder CEO and other insiders to purchase the stock. Consistent with the hypothesis we find
that bidder CEOs and other top executives are more likely to purchase stock when they talk
more about intangible aspects in the takeover announcements. The average marginal effect
on the probability of CEOs to buy stock associated with a one percentage point difference in
intangibles talk is 1.9%. Similarly, the probability that other top executives buy shares increases
by 1.7% with a one percentage point increase in intangibles talk. The relation is positive, but
not significant for board members.
A possible explanation for why CEOs and top executives buy shares after a takeover
announcement with much intangibles talk is that they just respond to the stock price decrease.
This story predicts a significant negative relation between the bidder CAR and propensity to
buy for each individual group, while the relation between buy dummies and intangibles talk
should disappear once we control for the bidder CAR. Regressions (4)-(6) of Table 10 show
that the intangibles talk coefficients are practically not affected by bidder abnormal returns
when compared to the results from the first three specifications.
Summary
Overall, this evidence of post-announcement stock purchases by executives suggests that in-
tangibles talk is indeed related to managerial overoptimism about the deal quality. By contrast,
there is no strong evidence in favor of the agency-based explanation.
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4.3 Target characteristics
As a final piece of evidence linking intangibles talk, eagerness of managers to complete a deal,
and value of a deal, we consider two aspects of cross-sectional heterogeneity.
First, we consider the public-private dimension, an important theme in the M&A lit-
erature. To do so, we interact intangibles talk with the public target dummy. The results are
reported Table 11. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A show that the interaction coefficients in
the bidder CAR regressions are significantly negative. In particular, the market reaction to in-
tangibles talk is about -1.3% to -1.4% more negative for public than for private target deals.
A separate analysis, in Supplementary Appendix Table SA.2, splits the sample and considers
public deals separately. We find a large and significantly negative effect of intangibles talk on
announcement returns among public deals. That analysis also provides an opportunity to ana-
lyze target and combined returns. We find that intangibles talk is positively, but insignificantly
associated with target abnormal returns. The net effect in the form of combined returns is still
negative.
In Panel B of Table 11, which studies deal completion, the interaction coefficients are
positive and significant meaning that intangibles talk is more positively related to deal comple-
tion probability for takeover announcements of public than private firms.
[Table 11 ABOUT HERE]
Finally, we also conjecture that intangibles talk is (a) more negatively related to CAR,
and (b) more positively related to deal completion probability, when the bidder announces the
acquisition of a firm that is likely to have few intangible assets, i.e., a firm operating in a
non-high-tech industry.20 This conjecture is confirmed in columns (3) and (4) of Table 11’s
Panels A and B: When bidder management refers frequently to intangibles when the target
firm presumably has very little intangible capital, this indicates eagerness on the part of bidder
management, and shareholders on average are not fond of such deals.
20As in Baginski et al. (2004), we identify companies in high-tech industries as those whose primary industry
is: drugs (SIC codes 2833-2836), research and development services (8731-8734), programming (7371-7379),
computers (3570-3577), or electronics (3600-3674).
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4.4 Robustness
Table 12 presents all main regressions with two additional, potentially important control vari-
ables: First, Panels A and B consider bidder intangible assets. It is conceivable that bidders talk
more about intangibles when they themselves have more such assets. Panel A shows in Column
(1) that when bidders have a higher absolute amount of intangible assets (according to Peters
and Taylor (2017)), they use more intangibles talk. Also, consistent with Li et al. (2017), these
bidders secure higher announcement returns. However, importantly, Columns (2) to (6) show
that intangibles talk continues to be negatively associated with market responses and operating
performance, and positively associated with insider trades. Panel B shows in Column (1) shows
that intangibles talk is not explained by intangible assets relative to total assets, but again the
remaining columns show that all our prior results continue to hold.
Next, it is conceivable that intangibles talk is used more by more or less competent
managers, or managers with certain backgrounds. Demerjian et al. (2012) estimate managerial
ability using data envelopment analysis: Firms that are more efficient in generating revenues
than one would expect based on their characteristics are estimated to be run by more competent
managers. A merit of this method is that can be applied to a wide range of firms. We use
their percentile rank measure (from 0 to 1, by industry and year), though the results also hold
with the cardinal score. Panel C shows that managerial ability is unrelated to intangibles talk.
Moreover, controlling for managerial ability does not change our results regarding the role of
intangibles talk in explaining merger performance and insider trading.21 In untabulated results,
we find (using data ranging until 2007 provided by Custo´dio et al. (2013)) that general ability,
having an MBA, or having an Ivy league degree also do not correlate with intangibles talk.
However, the number of observations drops to around 500 in this analysis.
[Table 12 ABOUT HERE]
The results are also robust if we control for positive and negative word frequencies
separately. We have also experimented with controlling for other textual aspects of the takeover
announcement. For example, we have controlled for its (textual) complexity by measuring
sentence length. To parse for sentences, we follow Loughran and McDonald (2014) and first
21It is somewhat surprising that in our sample managerial ability is unrelated to announcement returns.
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remove abbreviations and numbers, and then assume that the remaining periods are sentence
terminations. The average of words per sentence is then the number of words in the document
divided by the number of sentence terminations. The results remain robust controlling for this
measure of complexity.
5 Conclusion
Intangible assets represent an important component of firm value. Indeed, their importance
seems to be growing. For example, Lev (2012) documents a secular decline of the ability
of accounting data to explain share price differences across companies. It is, therefore, of
interest to know how managers communicate about intangibles. This paper presents the first
study quantifying intangibles talk, defined as the frequency of words associated with intangible
assets, in financial text. We construct a novel word list of intangible-related words to capture
what a financial release about a merger says about this hard-to-value asset class. Intangibles
are conceptually particularly important in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore,
we apply the list to corporate takeover announcements in the U.S. from 2002 to 2016. The
analysis reveals considerable variation in the use of intangibles talk in the announcements.
How much managers talk about intangible aspects significantly varies across industries and
depends on some deal and target characteristics. Notably, however, at least in public deals,
the intangible assets of the target do not explain much of the usage of intangible words in the
takeover announcements.
Intangibles talk is not just inconsequential managerial guff. It is positively related to
the deal completion probability – but negatively related to announcement returns. The strong
negative market reaction to intangibles talk suggest that managers do not use intangibles words
to disclose advantageous private information about the target. The agency explanation of the
relation between intangibles talk and negative announcement returns receives no strong support
in data. An analysis of insider trades reveals, by contrast, evidence of managerial overoptimism
about deals they describe with intangibles talk. We speculate that this overoptimism partly
arises because the importance of intangibles is a relatively new phenomenon. As such, business
school teachings and prior managerial experience are not (yet) sufficiently helpful in assessing
and communicating about deals along this dimension. Overall, these results suggest that it can
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pay off for investors to carefully study the phraseology of takeover announcements.
72
References
Ahern, Kenneth R, and Denis Sosyura, 2014, Who writes the news? Corporate press releases
during merger negotiations, The Journal of Finance 69, 241–291.
Aktas, Nihat, Eric De Bodt, Helen Bollaert, and Richard Roll, 2016, CEO narcissism and
the takeover process: From private initiation to deal completion, Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 51, 113–137.
Baginski, Stephen P, John M Hassell, and Michael D Kimbrough, 2004, Why do managers
explain their earnings forecasts?, Journal of Accounting Research 42, 1–29.
Bargeron, Leonce L, Frederik P Schlingemann, Rene´ M Stulz, and Chad J Zutter, 2008, Why do
private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers?, Journal of Financial Economics
89, 375–390.
Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, 2008, What matters in corporate gover-
nance?, The Review of Financial Studies 22, 783–827.
Bena, Jan, and Kai Li, 2014, Corporate innovations and mergers and acquisitions, The Journal
of Finance 69, 1923–1960.
Betton, Sandra, B Espen Eckbo, and Karin S Thorburn, 2008, Corporate takeovers, in B Espen
Eckbo, ed., Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, chapter 15,
291–430 (Elsevier/North-Holland).
Bodnaruk, Andriy, Tim Loughran, and Bill McDonald, 2015, Using 10-K text to gauge finan-
cial constraints, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 50, 623–646.
Buehlmaier, Matthias M, and Toni M Whited, 2015, Looking for risk in words: A narrative
approach to measuring the pricing implications of financial constraints, Working paper .
Buehlmaier, Matthias M, and Josef Zechner, 2017, Financial media, price discovery, and
merger arbitrage, Working paper .
Chen, I-Ju, Po-Hsuan Hsu, Micah S. Officer, and Yanzhi Wang, 2018, The Oscar goes to. . . :
Peer pressure, innovation competition, and takeovers, Working paper .
Chung, Kiseo, Clifton T Green, and Breno Schmidt, 2018, CEO home bias and corporate
acquisitions, Working paper .
Coles, John, Naveen Daniel, and Lalitha Naveen, 2006, Managerial incentives and risk-taking,
Journal of Financial Economics 79, 431–468.
Conrad, Jennifer, Bradford Cornell, Wayne R Landsman, and Brian R Rountree, 2006, How
do analyst recommendations respond to major news?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 41, 25–49.
Core, John E., and Wayne R. Guay, 2002, Estimating the value of employee stock option port-
folios and their sensitivities to price and volatility, Journal of Accounting Research 40, 613–
629.
Custo´dio, Cla´udia, Miguel Ferreira, and Pedro Matos, 2013, Generalists versus specialists:
Lifetime work experience and CEO pay, Journal of Financial Economics 108, 471–492.
73
Custo´dio, Cla´udia, and Daniel Metzger, 2013, How do CEOs matter? The effect of industry
expertise on acquisition returns, The Review of Financial Studies 26, 2008–2047.
Demerjian, Peter, Baruch Lev, and Sarah McVay, 2012, Quantifying managerial ability: A new
measure and validity tests, Management Science 58, 1229–1248.
Druz, Marina, Ivan Petzev, Alexander F Wagner, and Richard J Zeckhauser, 2018, When man-
agers change their tone, analysts and investors change their tune, Working paper .
Ferris, Stephen P, Narayanan Jayaraman, and Sanjiv Sabherwal, 2013, CEO overconfidence and
international merger and acquisition activity, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
48, 137–164.
Fre´sard, Laurent, Ulrich Hege, and Gordon Phillips, 2017, Extending industry specialization
through cross-border acquisitions, The Review of Financial Studies 30, 1539–1582.
Grinstein, Yaniv, and Paul Hribar, 2004, CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from
m&a bonuses, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 119–143.
Hall, Richard, 1992, The strategic analysis of intangible resources, Strategic Management Jour-
nal 13, 135–144.
Hoberg, Gerard, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 2015, Redefining financial constraints: A text-based
analysis, Review of Financial Studies 28, 1312–1352.
Hoberg, Gerard, and Gordon Phillips, 2010, Product market synergies and competition in merg-
ers and acquisitions: A text-based analysis, Review of Financial Studies 23, 3773–3811.
Jensen, Michael C, 1986, Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, The
American Economic Review 76, 323–329.
Jensen, Michael C, and William H Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.
John, Kose, Anzhela Knyazeva, and Diana Knyazeva, 2015, Employee rights and acquisitions,
Journal of Financial Economics 118, 49–69.
Kimbrough, Michael D, and Henock Louis, 2011, Voluntary disclosure to influence investor
reactions to merger announcements: An examination of conference calls, The Accounting
Review 86, 637–667.
Lev, Baruch, 2000, Intangibles: Management, measurement, and reporting (Brookings Institu-
tion Press).
Lev, Baruch, 2005, Intangible assets: Concepts and measurements, in Kimberly Kempf-
Leonard, ed., Encyclopedia of social measurement, volume 2, 299–305 (Elsevier New York,
NY).
Lev, Baruch, 2012, Winning investors over: Surprising truths about honesty, earnings guid-
ance, and other ways to boost your stock price, chapter 7, 145–172 (Harvard Business Press).
Li, Kai, Buhui Qiu, and Rui Shen, 2017, Organization capital and mergers and acquisitions,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis forthcoming.
74
Liu, Baixiao, and John J McConnell, 2013, The role of the media in corporate governance: Do
the media influence managers’ capital allocation decisions?, Journal of Financial Economics
110, 1–17.
Loughran, Tim, and Bill McDonald, 2011, When is a liability not a liability? Textual analysis,
dictionaries, and 10-Ks, The Journal of Finance 66, 35–65.
Loughran, Tim, and Bill McDonald, 2014, Measuring readability in financial disclosures, The
Journal of Finance 69, 1643–1671.
Loughran, Tim, and Bill McDonald, 2016, Textual analysis in accounting and finance: A sur-
vey, Journal of Accounting Research 54, 1187–1230.
Lys, Thomas Z, and Nir Yehuda, 2015, Do acquisitions of private targets create higher value?
The role of intangible assets acquired, Working paper .
Malmendier, Ulrike, and Geoffrey Tate, 2008, Who makes acquisitions? ceo overconfidence
and the market’s reaction, Journal of Financial Economics 89, 20–43.
Michaely, Roni, and Kent L Womack, 1999, Conflict of interest and the credibility of under-
writer analyst recommendations, The Review of Financial Studies 12, 653–686.
Moeller, Sara B, Frederik P Schlingemann, and Rene´ M Stulz, 2004, Firm size and the gains
from acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201–228.
Moeller, Sara B, Frederik P Schlingemann, and Rene´ M Stulz, 2007, How do diversity of
opinion and information asymmetry affect acquirer returns?, Review of Financial Studies 20,
2047–2078.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny, 1990, Do managerial objectives drive
bad acquisitions?, The Journal of Finance 45, 31–48.
Officer, Micah S, 2007, The price of corporate liquidity: Acquisition discounts for unlisted
targets, Journal of Financial Economics 83, 571–598.
Officer, Micah S, Annette B Poulsen, and Mike Stegemoller, 2009, Target-firm information
asymmetry and acquirer returns, Review of Finance 13, 467–493.
Peters, Ryan H, and Lucian A Taylor, 2017, Intangible capital and the investment-q relation,
Journal of Financial Economics 123, 251–272.
Phillips, Gordon M, and Alexei Zhdanov, 2013, R&D and the incentives from merger and
acquisition activity, Review of Financial Studies 26, 34–78.
Roll, Richard, 1986, The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers, Journal of Business 59,
197–216.
Savor, Pavel G, and Qi Lu, 2009, Do stock mergers create value for acquirers?, The Journal of
Finance 64, 1061–1097.
Schneider, Christoph, and Oliver G Spalt, 2017, Why does size matter so much for bidder
announcement returns?, Working paper .
Tate, Geoffrey A, and Liu Yang, 2016, The human factor in acquisitions: Cross-industry labor
mobility and corporate diversification, Working paper .
75
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
se
rv
ic
es
so
lu
tio
ns
cu
st
om
er
s
m
a
rk
et
te
ch
no
lo
gy
sy
st
em
s
m
a
rk
et
s
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
so
ftw
ar
e
se
rv
ic
e
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
da
ta
te
am
n
e
tw
or
k
ca
pa
bi
liti
es
e
m
pl
oy
ee
s
w
e
bs
ite
pl
at
fo
rm
cu
st
om
er
re
la
tio
ns
m
a
rk
et
in
g
e
xp
er
tis
e
po
te
nt
ia
l
st
ra
te
gy
re
se
a
rc
h
br
an
ds
cl
ie
nt
s
pa
rtn
er
s
br
an
d
sy
st
em
e
xp
er
ie
nc
e
pr
es
en
ce
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e
qu
al
ity
so
lu
tio
n
Figure 1: The most frequent intangibles words in takeover announcements
The figure presents the frequency of 35 most common intangibles words in takeover announcements. It is calcu-
lated as a ratio of each word count to the total count of all intangibles words (see 1) occurring in the announce-
ments. The sample consists of 2414 takeover deals announced between January 2002 and December 2016 with a
bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States.
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Figure 2: Intangibles talk over time
This figure plots the average frequency of intangibles words relative to the total word count in takeover announce-
ments over time. The frequency is calculated for the whole sample (solid line) and separately for deals with private
and public targets. The sample consists of 2414 takeover deals announced between January 2002 and December
2016 with a bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States.
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Figure 3: Intangibles words by target industry
This figure plots the average frequency of intangibles words relative to the total word count in takeover announce-
ments by target Fama-French 48 industries. Industries that have fewer than ten deals are not shown. The sample
consists of 2414 takeover deals announced between January 2002 and December 2016 with a bidder that is a
publicly traded company domiciled in the United States.
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Figure 4: Eager bidders and intangibles talk
The relation between the completion rate and the frequency of intangibles words in the announcement text is
shown on the left y-axis. The relation between time to completion and the frequency of intangibles words in the
announcement text is shown on the right y-axis. Time to completion is measured by the number of days it takes
to complete the deal following the announcement given that the bidder acquires the target. The sample is divided
into quintiles of intangibles talk. The sample consists of 2414 takeover deals announced between January 2002
and December 2016 with a bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States.
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Figure 5: Bidder returns and intangibles talk
The figure shows the relation between the bidder announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and the fre-
quency of intangibles words in the announcement text. The sample is divided into quintiles of intangibles talk.
The sample consists of 2414 takeover deals announced between January 2002 and December 2016 with a bidder
that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States. The announcement abnormal return is the cumu-
lative 3-day event period return minus the associated Carhart four-factor model return. Cumulative daily abnormal
returns are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Table 1: Intangibles word list
This table shows our intangibles word list. The list includes words and phrases that identify intangibles
based on Hall (1992), Lev (2005) and Lev (2012). Following Loughran and McDonald (2011), we add
the plural form of nouns, the simple past tense, the past participle, gerund and the third person present
tense for verbs. Additionally, we include appropriate synonyms and words with similar meaning.
Intangibles words
Abilities Customer relations Invented Program Trade names
Ability Customers Inventing Programs Trade secret
Advertising Data Invention Project Trade secrets
Algorithm Database Inventions Projects Trademark
Algortihms Databases Invents Protected design Trademarks
Alliance Design Invest Protected designs Trade-secret
Alliances Designs Invested Qualities Trade-secrets
Authorship Developed Investing Quality Training
Authorships Development Investment R&D User
Brand Developments Investments Registered design Users
Branding Discoveries Invests Registered designs Website
Brands Discovery Joint venture Relation Websites
Business model Efficiencies Joint ventures Relations Workforce
Business models Efficiency Knowhow Relationship
Business process Employee Know-how Relationships
Business processes Employees Knowledge Reputation
Capabilities Employee-training Label Research
Capability Experience Labels Researches
Capacities Expert Licence Rights
Capacity Expertise Licences Risk management
Client Experts Logo Service
Client relations Footprint Loyalty Service mark
Clients Footprints Market Service marks
Collaborate Formula Market share Services
Collaborated Formulae Marketing Site visits
Collaborates Franchise Markets Skill
Collaborating Franchises Model Skills
Collaboration Goodwill Models Software
Competence HR Network Solution
Competences Human capital Networks Solutions
Competencies Human resources Order backlog Strategies
Competency Incentive Organization capital Strategy
Connections Incentives Organizational design Structure
Connectivity Infrastructure Organizational designs Structures
Consumer Infrastructures Partner Supply chain
Consumers Innovate Partners Supply chains
Contract Innovated Patent System
Contracts Innovates Patented Systems
Copyright Innovating Patents Talent
Copyrights Innovation Platform Talents
Cost savings Innovations Platforms Team
Coverage Innovator Potential Teams
Coverages Innovators Potentials Teamwork
Culture Intangible assets Presence Technologies
Customer Intangibles Private-label Technology
Customer base Intellectual capital Private-labels Tool
Customer bases Intellectual property Process Tools
Customer list Internet activities Processes Trade mark
Customer lists Internet activity Product pipeline Trade marks
Customer relation Invent Productivity Trade name
81
Table 2: Variable definitions and sources
This table defines variables used in the analysis. They are obtained directly from or constructed using Compustat,
CRSP, EDGAR, ExecuComp, I/B/E/S (Recommendations - Summary Statistics section), SDC, Thomson Reuters institutional
(13F) stock holdings and Thomson Reuters Insider Filings (IF) databases.
Variable Definition Source
Textual variables
% Intangibles talk Ratio of the number of intangibles words to the total number of words in the takeover
announcement, expressed in %.
EDGAR
% Negative Ratio of the number of negative words to the total number of words in the takeover
announcement, expressed in %.
EDGAR
% Positive Ratio of the number of positive words to the total number of words in the takeover
announcement, expressed in %.
EDGAR
% Strong modal Ratio of the number of strong modal words to the total number of words in the
takeover announcement, expressed in %.
EDGAR
% Uncertainty Ratio of the number of uncertainty words to the total number of words in the takeover
announcement, expressed in %.
EDGAR
ln(Text length) Natural logarithm of the number of words in the takeover announcement. EDGAR
Negativity Ratio of the difference between the number of negative and positive words in the
takeover announcement to their sum.
EDGAR
Sentence length Average sentence length in the takeover announcement. EDGAR
Dependent variables
CAR(-1,1) Cumulative abnormal returns (in %) for the bidder firm from day -1 to day 1 calcu-
lated using the Carhart four-factor model. Model parameters are estimated over days
(-280, -31).
CRSP
CAR(-1,30) Cumulative abnormal returns (in %) for the bidder firm from day -1 to day 30 calcu-
lated using the Carhart four-factor model. Model parameters are estimated over days
(-280, -31).
CRSP
CARt(-1,1) 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (in %) for the target firm calculated using the
Carhart four-factor model. Model parameters are estimated over days (-280, -31).
CRSP
Completed 1 for completed acquisitions. SDC
Days to completion Number of days between the effective and announcement dates. SDC
∆ROA(0,T) Acquiring firm T-year post acquisition increase in return on assets benchmarked to
the mean performance of a portfolio of 2-digit SIC industry peers that do not differ
more than 50% in size from the acquirer, and are not involved in any acquisition
during a six-year period surrounding the transaction. The variable is expressed in
percentage points.
Compustat
V.w. comb. CAR(-1,1) Value-weighted average of the bidder and target CAR(-1,1) where weights are cal-
culated as day 0 market value of equity. The variable is expressed in %.
CRSP
∆Analyst recom. Change in the analyst recommendation calculated as a difference between the earli-
est available median recommendation that is calculated within the 7-60 days period
after the takeover announcement and the most recent median recommendation cal-
culated within the 7-60 days period before the takeover announcement. Thomson
Reuters calculates median recommendations by assigning to each contributing ana-
lyst’s recommendation an integer based on the standardized Thomson Reuters rec-
ommendation scale and calculating a real number median. We construct and use the
inversed scale as follows: 5. Strong Buy, 4. Buy, 3. Hold, 2. Underperform, 1. Sell.
I/B/E/S
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
CEO buys 1 if the number of shares a CEO purchases exceeds the number of shares he sells
over a trading window that begins 2 days after the announcement and ends 60 days
after the announcement or the effective day if it comes first.
TR IF
Directors buy 1 if the aggregate number of shares board members purchase exceeds the aggre-
gate number of shares they sell over a trading window that begins 2 days after the
announcement and ends 60 days after the announcement or the effective day if it
comes first. Board members who hold an executive role (CEO, CFO, COO, CIO or
CTO) are excluded.
TR IF
Top Execs buy 1 if the aggregate number of shares top executives (CFO, COO, CIO and CTO),
aside from the CEO, purchase exceeds the aggregate number of shares they sell over
a trading window that begins 2 days after the announcement and ends 60 days after
the announcement or the effective day if it comes first.
TR IF
Price premium 1w Premium of offer price (in %) to target closing stock price 1 week prior to the original
announcement date.
SDC
Price premium 4w Premium of offer price (in %) to target closing stock price 4 weeks prior to the
original announcement date.
SDC
Measures of intangible assets
ln(Intan. assetsacq)j Natural logarithm of j=[b(idder), t(arget)] intangible assets (in millions of US $)
measured as deal size minus the book value of tangible assets of the target [Tangible
assets = Total assets (AT) - Intangible assets (INTAN)].
Compustat,
SDC
ln(Intan. assetsbv)j Natural logarithm of the book value of j=[b(idder), t(arget)] intangible assets (in
millions of US $).
Compustat
ln(Intan. assetsPT)j Natural logarithm of j=[b(idder), t(arget)] intangible assets (in millions of US $)
measured as in Peters and Taylor (2017). The measure, labeled as K int and de-
fined as the estimated replacement cost of the firm’s intangible capital, is available
thorough WRDS.
WRDS
(ITacq/AT)j Ratio of j=[b(idder), t(arget)] intangible assets to the book value of target total assets.
Intangible assets are measured as deal size minus the book value of tangible assets
[Tangible assets = Total assets (AT) - Intangible assets (INTAN)].
Compustat,
SDC
(ITbv/AT)j Ratio of the book value of j=[b(idder), t(arget)] intangible assets to the book value
of target total assets.
Compustat
(ITPT/AT)j Ratio of j=[b(idder), t(arget)] intangible assets to the book value of target total assets.
Intangible assets are measured as in Peters and Taylor (2017). The measure, labeled
as K int and defined as the estimated replacement cost of the firm’s intangible capital,
is available thorough WRDS.
Compustat,
WRDS
Control variables
Acquirer term. fee 1 if the acquirer is liable to pay a termination fee to the target. SDC
Cash 1 for deals financed with cash only. SDC
Cross-country 1 when the bidder and the target are not from the same country. SDC
Cross-industry 1 when the bidder and the target are in a different 2-digit SIC code industry. SDC
Deal size Total value of the transaction (millions of US $). SDC
Friendly 1 if attitude of the target management is friendly. SDC
High-tech 1 when the target belong to the following industries: drugs (SIC codes 2833-2836),
research and development services (8731-8734), programming (7371-7379), com-
puters (3570-3577), and electronics (3600-3674), as in Baginski et al. (2004).
SDC
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Low executive incen-
tives
1 for bidders with below industry-median executive incentives to increase the share
price (equity delta, as in Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006)).
Lalitha
Naveen
Low inst. stake 1 for bidders with below median stock ownership by institutional investors. TR 13F
Market cap Bidder market capitalization [=Share price (PRCC F)× Number of shares outstand-
ing (CSHO) (millions of US $)] at the last fiscal year end before the takeover an-
nouncement.
Compustat
Market-to-book Ratio of the bidder market capitalization to its book value of equity [=Total share-
holders’ equity (SEQ) + Deferred taxes and investment tax credits (TXDITC) - Pre-
ferred stock liquidating value (PSTKL)] at the last fiscal year end before the takeover
announcement.
Compustat
Mixed 1 for deals financed with a mix of cash and stock. SDC
Multiple bidders 1 when there is more than one bidder. SDC
Private 1 when the target is a private. SDC
Public 1 when the target is a publicly listed company. SDC
Relative size Ratio of the deal size to the bidder market capitalization at the last fiscal year end
before the takeover announcement.
Compustat,
SDC
ROA Bidder firm return on assets [EBITDA / Book value of assets (AT)] at the last fiscal
year end before the takeover announcement, expressed in %.
Compustat
Shares 1 for deals financed with stock only. SDC
Target term. fee 1 if the target is liable to pay a termination fee to the acquirer. SDC
Tender offer 1 when the deal is structured as a tender offer SDC
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. Panel A reports statistics for the
announcement text variables. Panel B reports statistics for the dependent variables. Different measures of target
intangible assets are presented in Panel C, followed by the control variables presented in Panel D. The sample
consists of takeover deals announced between January 2002 and December 2016 with the bidder that is a publicly
traded company domiciled in the United States. We require that deal and bidder data are available in SDC, CRSP
and COMPUSTAT, and that the takeover announcement is accessible through EDGAR. We collect transactions
with at least $1 million deal value and 1% relative size (deal value to bidder market capitalization ratio) and that
are not labeled as as recapitalizations, repurchases, self-tenders, nor exchange offers. We require that the bidder
owns at least 80% of the target after the purchase in case of completed deals, and not more than 15% before the
announcement. Bidders that operate in regulated utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) or financial industry (SIC code
6000-6999) are excluded from the sample. % Intangibles talk is defined as the number of intangibles words
divided by the total number of words in the announcement, expressed in percent. The detailed description of the
other variables is provided in Table 2.
Mean Median St. Dev. p25 p75
Panel A: Textual variables
% Intangibles talk 2.38 2.29 1.00 1.64 3.03
% Negative 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.17 0.46
% Positive 1.41 1.35 0.58 1.00 1.78
% Strong modal 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.24
% Uncertainty 0.42 0.39 0.23 0.26 0.55
Negativity -0.55 -0.59 0.26 -0.74 -0.42
Panel B: Dependent variables
CAR(-1,1) [%] 0.39 0.22 8.33 -3.21 3.81
CAR(-1,30) [%] -1.61 -0.87 18.6 -10.4 8.08
CARt(-1,1) [%] 25.1 20.8 22.0 10.3 36.2
Completed 0.93 1 0.25 1 1
Days to completion 54.3 34 65.6 0 81
∆ROA(0,1) [%] 1.02 0.94 8.03 -2.06 3.98
∆ROA(0,3) [%] 0.81 1.12 11.4 -3.64 5.29
V.w. comb. CAR(-1,1) 3.59 2.27 8.35 -0.63 7.75
CEO buys 0.13 0 0.34 0 0
Directors buy 0.16 0 0.36 0 0
Top Execs buy 0.078 0 0.27 0 0
Price premium 4w 44.4 34.5 44.9 20.8 56.1
Price premium 1w 40.3 31.9 39.6 19.2 49.3
Panel C: Target intangible assets (public targets only)
(Intan. assetsbv)t [USDm] 320.0 30.6 798.6 1.76 210.6
(Intan. assetsacq)t [USDm] 1278.8 203.5 3147.5 30.0 1142.0
(Intan. assetsPT)t [USDm] 714.3 188.4 1655.6 71.4 558.7
(IAbv/AT)t 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.016 0.30
(IAacq/AT)t 1.55 0.84 2.30 0.18 1.76
(IAPT/AT)t 0.92 0.71 0.96 0.40 1.06
Panel D: Control variables
Acquirer term. fee 0.097 0 0.30 0 0
Cash 0.57 1 0.49 0 1
Cross-country 0.15 0 0.36 0 0
Cross-industry 0.35 0 0.48 0 1
Deal size [USDm] 581.1 74.6 1781.3 21.8 300
Friendly 0.98 1 0.14 1 1
High-tech 0.43 0 0.50 0 1
Market cap [USDm] 4028.0 654.9 12588.1 188.5 2010.8
Market-to-book 3.37 2.40 3.21 1.59 3.88
Mixed 0.32 0 0.47 0 1
Multiple bidders 0.025 0 0.16 0 0
Private 0.70 1 0.46 0 1
Public 0.30 0 0.46 0 1
Relative size 0.30 0.13 0.47 0.050 0.32
ROA [%] 8.00 11.4 17.5 5.22 16.4
Shares 0.11 0 0.31 0 0
Target term. fee 0.24 0 0.43 0 0
Tender offer 0.062 0 0.24 0 0
Observations 2414
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Table 4: What explains intangibles talk?
This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable, % Intangibles talk, is defined as the number
of intangibles words divided by the total number of words in the takeover announcement, expressed in percent.
Panel A reports results for the full sample (2414 takeover announcements between January 2002 and December
2016 with the bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States), while panel B is limited
to public target deals as financial data are not available for private targets. Deal size is the transaction volume in
US$ million. Public is a dummy variable equal to one when the target is a publicly listed company. Panel B uses
three measures of the target’s intangible assets described in the text and in Table 2. The measures of the target’s
intangible assets are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Each regression includes industry and year fixed
effects. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by the announcement year and are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
(a) Panel A: Full sample
(1) (2)
ln(Deal size) -0.092∗∗∗
(0.011)
Public -0.433∗∗∗
(0.035)
Constant 1.249∗∗∗ 1.756∗∗∗
(0.299) (0.346)
Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.31
Observations 2414 2414
(b) Panel B: Public targets: The role of target intangible assets
Book value IA measures Acquired IA measures PT(2017) IA measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ln(Deal size) -0.020 -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 -0.029 -0.021
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
ln(Intan. assetsbv)t 0.000 0.004
(0.006) (0.004)
(IAbv/AT)t 0.034 0.070
(0.142) (0.138)
ln(Intan. assetsacq)t -0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
(IAacq/AT)t 0.006 0.009
(0.013) (0.013)
ln(Intan. assetsPT)t -0.003 0.021
(0.027) (0.031)
(IAPT/AT)t -0.007 -0.022
(0.029) (0.033)
Constant 1.505∗∗∗ 1.621∗∗∗ 1.469∗∗∗ 1.572∗∗∗ 1.468∗∗∗ 1.577∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗ 1.567∗∗∗ 1.520∗∗∗ 1.576∗∗∗ 1.468∗∗∗ 1.596∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.153) (0.050) (0.152) (0.054) (0.161) (0.054) (0.160) (0.146) (0.165) (0.053) (0.178)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Observations 529 529 528 528 528 528 528 528 525 525 524 524
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Table 5: Deal completion
This table reports the analysis of the relation between intangibles talk and deal completion. The first two specifica-
tions report results of probit regressions estimating the propensity for the bidder to complete the deal following the
takeover announcement. The last two specifications report OLS regression results for the number of days it takes to
complete the deal, given that the bidder acquires the target. The sample consists of takeover deals announced be-
tween January 2002 and December 2016 with the bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United
States. % Intangibles talk is defined as the number of intangibles words divided by the total number of words in the
announcement, expressed as a percent. Additional variable descriptions are provided in Table 2. The continuous depen-
dent variable (Days to completion) and continuous control variables (CAR, ROA, market-to-book ratio, bidder market
capitalization, and the deal relative size) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The first two specifications report
average marginal effects instead of estimated coefficients. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered
by the announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
Completion Days to complete
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Intangibles talk 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -4.514∗∗∗ -4.087∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (1.283) (1.255)
Negativity -0.039∗∗∗ 7.271∗
(0.009) (3.630)
% Uncertainty -0.044∗∗ 0.489
(0.018) (5.420)
% Strong modal -0.075∗∗ 8.936
(0.032) (7.078)
Public -0.072∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ 47.589∗∗∗ 47.927∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (6.484) (6.492)
Mixed 0.011 0.006 9.756∗∗ 10.132∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (3.744) (3.789)
Shares -0.029 -0.044∗ 37.019∗∗∗ 37.423∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (3.641) (3.707)
CAR(-1,1) [%] 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.074
(0.001) (0.001) (0.182) (0.180)
Relative size -0.019∗ -0.021∗∗ 32.677∗∗∗ 33.097∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (4.272) (4.334)
Cross-industry 0.014 0.016 1.240 1.308
(0.012) (0.012) (3.307) (3.320)
Cross-country -0.010 -0.014 3.704 3.947
(0.011) (0.011) (3.196) (3.186)
Tender offer 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ -30.426∗∗∗ -30.517∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (4.664) (4.718)
Multiple bidders -0.305∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ 16.893 16.216
(0.086) (0.084) (16.042) (16.248)
Friendly 0.349∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 3.730 3.552
(0.081) (0.076) (13.111) (12.927)
Target term. fee 0.057∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 7.422 7.569
(0.010) (0.009) (5.276) (5.311)
Acquirer term. fee -0.023 -0.025 24.046∗∗∗ 24.093∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (4.918) (4.918)
ROA [%] 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.043 -0.031
(0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.131)
ln(Market cap) 0.005 0.004 5.302∗∗∗ 5.293∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.907) (0.910)
Market-to-book -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.192 0.213
(0.001) (0.001) (0.420) (0.422)
Constant -11.223 -12.083
(20.659) (20.902)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.46
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.33
Observations 2414 2414 2256 225687
Table 6: Abnormal bidder returns
This table reports OLS regression results for the bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns, CAR(-1,1) and CAR(-
1,30), measured using Carhart four-factor model returns. The sample consists of takeover announcements between
January 2002 and December 2016 with the bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United
States. % Intangibles talk is defined as the number of intangibles words divided by the total number of words
in the announcement, expressed as a percent. Additional variable descriptions are provided in Table 2. The
dependent variables (CAR(-1,1) and CAR(-1,30)) and continuous control variables (ROA, market-to-book ratio,
bidder market capitalization, and the deal relative size) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by the announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR(-1,1) [%] CAR(-1,1) [%] CAR(-1,30) [%] CAR(-1,30) [%]
% Intangibles talk -0.468∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗ -0.740∗ -0.678∗
(0.172) (0.162) (0.393) (0.378)
Negativity -0.289 1.777
(0.763) (1.599)
% Uncertainty 1.205 -0.674
(0.717) (1.910)
% Strong modal 0.216 4.237
(1.204) (3.451)
Public -2.948∗∗∗ -2.933∗∗∗ -3.020∗∗ -2.915∗∗
(0.933) (0.916) (1.136) (1.144)
Mixed -0.864∗∗ -0.823∗∗ -1.120 -1.014
(0.370) (0.382) (0.804) (0.807)
Shares -1.703∗∗ -1.609∗ -4.393∗∗∗ -4.284∗∗∗
(0.726) (0.773) (1.430) (1.412)
Relative size 0.978 0.967 0.519 0.672
(0.678) (0.698) (1.283) (1.295)
Cross-industry -0.256 -0.242 -0.662 -0.654
(0.383) (0.389) (1.022) (1.029)
Cross-country -0.166 -0.156 -0.328 -0.243
(0.475) (0.484) (1.043) (1.040)
Tender offer 1.907∗ 1.990∗ 1.277 1.264
(0.945) (0.968) (1.280) (1.280)
Multiple bidders -1.169 -1.285 -0.541 -0.806
(1.664) (1.653) (2.675) (2.765)
Friendly -0.607 -0.544 5.673 6.108
(1.171) (1.155) (3.941) (3.846)
ROA [%] 0.000 -0.000 0.078∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.033) (0.032)
ln(Market cap) -0.355∗∗ -0.351∗∗ -0.187 -0.185
(0.122) (0.125) (0.295) (0.297)
Market-to-book 0.102 0.103 -0.318 -0.316
(0.075) (0.075) (0.220) (0.220)
Constant 14.231∗∗∗ 14.243∗∗∗ 9.711 9.037
(3.628) (3.733) (16.519) (16.730)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
Observations 2414 2414 2414 2414
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Table 7: Ex-post performance
The table reports OLS regression results for changes in the bidder performance (∆ROA) following the acquisition.
The sample consists of completed takeover deals announced between January 2002 and December 2016 with the
bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States. The first specifications report results for
changes in ROA from year 0 to year 1 while the last two specifications report results for a 3-year period, where
year 0 is defined as the year of acquisition. We adjust bidder ROA changes by subtracting those of the bidder’s
industry peers. For each bidder, we construct a portfolio of peers that do not differ more than 50% in size from
the bidder, operate in the same 2-digit SIC industry, and are not involved in any acquisition during a six-year
period surrounding the transaction. The benchmark is calculated as a mean performance change of each portfolio.
% Intangibles talk is defined as the number of intangibles words divided by the total number of words in the
announcement, expressed as a percent. Additional variable descriptions are provided in Table 2. The dependent
variable (∆ROA), and continuous control variables (ROA, market-to-book ratio, bidder market capitalization, and
the deal relative size) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The standard errors (reported in parentheses)
are clustered by the announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** -
5%, *** - 1%
1 year 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Intangibles talk -0.169 -0.423∗ -0.293 -0.601
(0.244) (0.230) (0.424) (0.428)
Negativity -2.621∗∗ -2.819∗
(0.955) (1.483)
% Uncertainty 0.910 -1.126
(1.040) (1.907)
% Strong modal 2.372 2.474
(1.518) (3.115)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Observations 1862 1862 1348 1348
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Table 8: Analyst stock recommendations
The table reports OLS regression results for analyst stock recommendation changes (∆Analyst recom.) following
the takeover announcement. The sample consists of the takeovers announced between January 2002 and Decem-
ber 2016 with the bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States. The change in the
analyst recommendation is calculated as a difference between the earliest available median recommendation that
is calculated within the 7-60 days period after the takeover announcement and the most recent median recommen-
dation calculated within the 7-60 days period before the takeover announcement. Thomson Reuters calculates
median recommendations by assigning to each contributing analyst’s recommendation an integer based on the
standardized Thomson Reuters recommendation scale and calculating a real number median. We construct and
use the inversed scale as follows: 5. Strong Buy, 4. Buy, 3. Hold, 2. Underperform, 1. Sell. % Intangibles talk is
defined as the number of intangibles words divided by the total number of words in the announcement, expressed
as a percent. Additional variable descriptions are provided in Table 2. The continuous control variables (ROA,
market-to-book ratio, bidder market capitalization, and the deal relative size) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by the announcement year and are robust
to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
(1) (2) (3)
% Intangibles talk -0.023∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.021∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Negativity -0.008
(0.027)
% Uncertainty -0.008
(0.026)
% Strong modal 0.121∗
(0.061)
Controls No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.02
Observations 2146 2146 2146
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Table 9: Corporate governance and intangibles talk
The table reports the effect of intangibles talk on bidder returns and deal completion conditional on the
quality of corporate governance of the bidder. The sample consists of the takeovers announced between
January 2002 and December 2016 with the bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the
United States. In Panel A, we summarize OLS regression results for bidder cumulative abnormal returns,
CAR(-1,1), measured using Carhart four-factor model. In Panel B, we report the results from probit re-
gressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the deal is completed and zero
otherwise. % Intangibles talk is defined as the number of intangibles words divided by the total num-
ber of words in the announcement, expressed as a percent. We interact intangibles talk with measures
of poor corporate governance, Low executive incentives and Low institutional stake.Additional variable
descriptions are provided in Table 2. CAR and continuous control variables (ROA, market-to-book ratio,
bidder market capitalization, and the deal relative size) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by the announcement year and are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
(a) Panel A: Bidder CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Intangibles talk -0.748∗∗ -0.851∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗ -0.747∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.349) (0.215) (0.216)
Low executive incentives -1.397∗∗ -1.399∗∗
(0.470) (0.471)
Low executive incentives × % Intangibles talk 0.073 0.094
(0.342) (0.347)
Low inst. stake 0.237 0.232
(0.429) (0.428)
Low inst. stake × % Intangibles talk 0.470 0.461
(0.336) (0.343)
Textual variables No Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05
Observations 1130 1130 2403 2403
(b) Panel B: Deal completion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Intangibles talk -0.215 -0.244∗ 0.078 0.028
(0.159) (0.148) (0.068) (0.061)
Low executive incentives -0.607∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.208)
Low executive incentives × % Intangibles talk 0.407∗∗ 0.396∗∗
(0.201) (0.188)
Low inst. stake -0.130 -0.139
(0.165) (0.168)
Low inst. stake × % Intangibles talk 0.125 0.151
(0.131) (0.128)
Textual variables No Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.53 0.32 0.33
Observations 1130 1130 2403 2403
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Table 10: Insider trading and intangibles talk
The table reports results of probit regressions that estimate the propensity for the acquirer CEO and other insiders
to buy stock following the takeover announcement. The sample consists of the takeovers announced between
January 2002 and December 2016 with the bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United
States. We calculate the total number of shares traded by the CEO, Top Executives and Board members during
the period 2-60 days after the takeover announcement. If the CEO or insider group has a positive total number
of shares traded, we classify the trade as a buy. The first three specifications report results for each group while
the last three specifications report results controlling for the bidder 3-day abnormal return. % Intangibles talk is
defined as the number of intangibles words divided by the total number of words in the announcement, expressed
as a percent. Additional variable descriptions are provided in Table 2. The table reports average marginal effects
instead of estimated coefficients. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by the announcement
year and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO buys Top Execs buy Directors buy CEO buys Top Execs buy Directors buy
% Intangibles talk 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.012 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
CAR(-1,1) [%] -0.002∗∗ 0.000 -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06
Observations 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414
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Table 11: Target characteristics and intangibles talk
The table reports the effect of intangibles talk on bidder returns and deal completion when the target is classified
as a low intangible assets firm. The sample consists of the takeovers announced between January 2002 and
December 2016 with the bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States. In Panel A,
we report cross-sectional regression results for bidder cumulative abnormal returns, CAR(-1,1), measured using
the Carhart four-factor model. In Panel B, we report the results from probit regressions in which the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the deal is completed and zero otherwise. We interact intangibles talk with
measures of low intangible assets firms, Public and Non-nigh-tech. Public indicates a publicly listed target, and
Non-high-tech denotes targets that operate in the industry that is not classified as High-tech, as in Baginski et al.
(2004). % Intangibles talk is defined as the number of intangibles words divided by the total number of words
in the announcement, expressed as a percent. Additional variable descriptions are provided in Table 2. CAR and
continuous control variables (ROA, market-to-book ratio, bidder market capitalization, and the deal relative size)
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by the
announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
(a) Panel A: Bidder CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deal size: All All Small Large All All
% Intangibles talk -0.392∗ -0.406∗ -0.054 -1.192∗∗∗ -0.203 -0.246
(0.221) (0.213) (0.254) (0.319) (0.314) (0.333)
Public -3.097∗∗∗ -3.099∗∗∗ -4.663∗∗∗ -2.647∗∗∗ -3.071∗∗∗ -3.053∗∗∗
(0.933) (0.916) (0.944) (0.803) (0.868) (0.859)
Public × % Intangibles talk -0.433 -0.482 -1.227∗∗ 0.378
(0.476) (0.489) (0.542) (0.504)
Non-high-tech 1.806∗∗∗ 1.746∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.326)
Non-high-tech × % Intangibles talk -0.650∗ -0.642∗
(0.349) (0.351)
Textual variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.05
Observations 2414 2414 1211 1196 2414 2414
(b) Panel B: Deal completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Intangibles talk 0.083 0.050 0.040 0.038 0.084 0.057
(0.058) (0.062) (0.068) (0.215) (0.065) (0.068)
Public -0.700∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗∗ -0.265 -1.136∗∗∗ -0.691∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.230) (0.218) (0.369) (0.204) (0.199)
Public × % Intangibles talk 0.250∗ 0.266∗ 0.430∗∗ 0.220
(0.145) (0.136) (0.187) (0.231)
Non-high-tech -0.122 -0.112
(0.110) (0.108)
Non-high-tech × % Intangibles talk 0.111 0.101
(0.085) (0.079)
Textual variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.47 0.27 0.29
Observations 2277 2277 1084 1050 2414 2414
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Table 12: Robustness: Bidder intangible assets and managerial ability
The table summarizes all main regressions in presence of additional control variables, the size of bidder intangible
assets and bidder managerial ability. The sample consists of the takeovers announced between January 2002
and December 2016 with the bidder that is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States. Column
(1) reports results of OLS regressions for intangibles talk as the dependent variable. Column (2) presents probit
regressions that estimate the propensity for the bidder to complete the deal following the takeover announcement.
Column (3) reports OLS regression results for the number of days it takes to complete the deal, given that the
bidder acquires the target. Column (4) reports OLS regression results for bidder cumulative abnormal returns,
CAR(-1,1), measured using the Carhart four-factor model return. Column (5) reports OLS regression results for
changes in ROA from year 0 to year 1, where year 0 is defined as the year of acquisition. We adjust bidder
ROA changes by subtracting those of the bidder’s industry peers. Finally, Column (6) reports results of probit
regressions that estimate the propensity for the acquirer CEO to buy stock following the takeover announcement.
For details, see the prior tables. % Intangibles talk is defined as the number of intangibles words divided by the
total number of words in the announcement, expressed as a percent. ln(Intan. assetsPT)b is the natural logarithm of
bidder intangible assets. (ITPT/AT)b is the ratio of bidder intangible assets to the book value of bidder total assets.
For both variables, intangible assets are measured as in Peters and Taylor (2017). Managerial ability (in percentile
ranks by industry and year) is from Demerjian et al. (2012). All regressions include industry and year fixed effects
as well as the same firm-specific and deal-specific controls as before, as well as controls for negativity, uncertainty,
and strong modal words in the announcement. Additional variable descriptions are provided in Table 2. The
continuous dependent variables (Days to completion, CAR and ∆ROA) and continuous control variables (ln(Intan.
assetsPT), (ITPT/AT)b, ROA, market-to-book ratio, bidder market capitalization, and the deal relative size) are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Regressions (2) and regression (6) report average marginal effects
instead of estimated coefficients. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by the announcement
year and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
(a) Panel A: Bidder intangibles (absolute)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intangibles talk Completed Days to completion CAR(-1,1) ∆ROA(0,1) CEO buys
% Intangibles talk 0.010∗∗ -4.255∗∗∗ -0.480∗∗∗ -0.421∗ 0.015∗
(0.005) (1.325) (0.158) (0.231) (0.008)
ln(Intan. assetsPT)b 0.026∗∗ 0.003 -3.163∗ 0.463∗ 0.084 -0.033∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.004) (1.716) (0.242) (0.330) (0.004)
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.45 0.05 0.04
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.09
Observations 2397 2397 2240 2397 1860 2397
(b) Panel B: Bidder intangibles (relative)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intangibles talk Completed Days to completion CAR(-1,1) ∆ROA(0,1) CEO buys
% Intangibles talk 0.010∗∗ -4.192∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗ -0.424∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (1.295) (0.163) (0.231) (0.007)
(IAPT/AT)b 0.057 0.014∗∗ -8.619∗∗∗ -0.572 0.767 0.050∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.007) (2.663) (0.482) (0.911) (0.018)
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.45 0.05 0.04
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.07
Observations 2397 2397 2240 2397 1860 2397
(c) Panel C: Managerial ability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intangibles talk Completed Days to completion CAR(-1,1) ∆ROA(0,1) CEO buys
% Intangibles talk 0.010∗∗ -3.435∗∗ -0.493∗∗ -0.419 0.018∗
(0.005) (1.313) (0.177) (0.251) (0.010)
Managerial ability 0.141 0.026 2.420 -0.832 -0.211 -0.205∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.033) (9.147) (1.292) (1.198) (0.075)
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.46 0.05 0.05
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.07
Observations 2267 2267 2129 2267 1796 2267
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Supplementary Appendix
A Target intangible assets
Table SA.1: Correlation of the measures of target intangible assets
The table reports the correlation coefficients for three different measures of target intangible assets that are used
in the analysis. Panel A reports the correlation between the measures of absolute size of target intangible assets
while panel B presents the correlation between the ratios of intangible assets to target total assets size. Intan.
assetsb is the book value of target intangible assets. Intan. assetsacq is the estimate of acquired target intangible
assets calculated as the difference between deal size and the book value of target tangible assets. Intan. assetsPT is
the estimated replacement cost of target’s intangible capital (introduced in Peters and Taylor (2017) and available
in WRDS). IA/AT is the ratio of target intangible assets (IA) to the book value of target total assets (AT).
(a) Panel A: Absolute size
(Intan. assetsbv)t (Intan. assetsacq)t (Intan. assetsPT)t
(Intan. assetsbv)t 1
(Intan. assetsacq)t 0.563∗∗∗ 1
(Intan. assetsPT)t 0.817∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 1
(b) Panel A: Size relative to total assets
(IAbv/AT)t (IAacq/AT)t (IAPT/AT)t
(IAbv/AT)t 1
(IAacq/AT)t -0.033 1
(IAPT/AT)t -0.0057 0.093∗∗ 1
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B Combined announcement returns
Table SA.2: Combined announcement returns for public targets
The table reports regression results for bidder, target and combined cumulative abnormal returns, CAR(-1,1),
measured using Carhart four-factor model return. Combined CAR is calculated as a value weighted average of the
bidder and target CAR(-1,1) where weights are calculated as day 0 market value of equity. The sample consists
of 740 public-target takeover announcements between January 2002 and December 2016 with the bidder that
is a publicly traded company domiciled in the United States. % Intangibles talk is defined as the number of
intangibles words divided by the total number of words in the announcement, expressed as a percent. Additional
variable descriptions are provided in Table 2. The dependent variables (combined, bidder and target CAR), and
continuous control variables (ROA, market-to-book ratio, bidder market capitalization, and the deal relative size)
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered by the
announcement year and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: : * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%
Bidder CAR Target CAR Combined CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Intangibles talk -1.673∗∗∗ -1.795∗∗∗ 0.779 0.204 -1.338∗∗ -1.537∗∗
(0.394) (0.382) (2.399) (2.568) (0.611) (0.712)
Negativity -0.132 -5.928 -2.061
(1.270) (6.332) (2.363)
% Uncertainty 3.004 0.895 1.784
(1.921) (6.200) (2.156)
% Strong modal 4.463 9.703 2.726
(3.549) (10.358) (3.866)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.21 0.21
Observations 725 725 497 497 497 497
C Data appendix
C.1 8-K download and identification
The download procedure starts with quarterly master index files from EDGAR. The indexes can
be found at the following location: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/full-index/
[year]/QTR[1-4]/master.zip, and have entries in this form: CIK|CompanyName|FormType|
DateFiled|Filename.22 The indexes contain the whole universe of filings. We loop through
them and look for the CIK codes from our takeover sample that are associated with the 8-K
form type, and are filed no later than 4 business days after the announcement date.23 We al-
low for filings that are made one business day before the announcement date reported by SDC
22For example, the first quarter master index file in 2007 is located here:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/full-index/2007/QTR1/master.zip
and one of its entries is:
1004155|AGLRESOURCESINC|10-K|2007-02-07|edgar/data/1004155/0001004155-07-000038.txt
23We construct a business day calendar by downloading the S&P 500 index from CRSP and keeping only
trading dates from the set.
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due to inconsistencies across EDGAR and SDC (see Section C.2). Some companies file mul-
tiple 8-Ks within 4-day period after the announcement, which requires additional verification
checks.
When companies file with the SEC they rarely submit only one document. EDGAR
takes all filing documents, processes them, and then bunches those together into a single text
file. A typical 8-K filing has a SEC header and one or more documents that follow. There is no
announcement date nor announcement time specified in the header. The acceptance time field
is missing in some filings. Acquisition announcements are saved in one of the documents that
follow the header. The documents can be either in text, html or pdf format. Each one starts
with the <DOCUMENT> tag that is followed by a number of document header fields after which
comes the actual content bounded by the <TEXT> and </TEXT> tags. The documents end with
the </DOCUMENT> tag. The document header contains a type, a sequence number, filename
and the document description. Press releases of acquisition announcements are saved in the
documents that are labelled as Exhibit 99, Exhibit 99.1, Exhibit 99.2, etc. There is no
document type or attachment number that uniquely identifies acquisition filings or acquisition
announcement press releases. We parse all filings and identify the documents we need based
on their content.
First, we split 8-K files into documents using document tags, <DOCUMENT> and </DOCUMENT>.
The text files extracted from an 8-K filing are already in the format that can be used in the fur-
ther analysis, while both html and pdf files need some additional processing before we can
get any useful text from them. Html files have a lot of overhead in the form of html tags that
carry no announcement information, but rather give structure to unstructured text. Pdf files
have no overhead, but are in the binary format. We use Apache Tika to clean documents that
are in the html or pdf format. This procedure works immediately with html documents. It fails
when applied directly to pdf files extracted and saved in the form they are found in 8-K text
files. The procedure does not work because pdf files are encoded using uuencoding, a form of
binary-to-text encoding, before they are put into the 8-K text files. Therefore, we first decode
pdf files, that is translate them from text to the binary format, and then we apply Tika methods
on the decoded pdf files. This yields clean text that can be used for announcement detection
and further textual analysis.
The next task is the most challenging one, the announcement identification itself. We
read and analyze dozens of the documents that we have extracted from 8-K files. We then
develop a procedure that aims to replicate our own reasoning behind the conclusion we make
when facing a problem to identify announcements, and minimize the number of the documents
wrongly labeled as potential announcements. We find that a typical announcement press release
document has a title section that is followed by an announcement body. The title section can be
very short and contain only the title itself, but there are cases when it is rather long with many
bullet points and additional information. The announcement body typically starts with Place +
Date + Acquirer + Acquirer Ticker, “the body start” hereafter. Yet there is some variation. For
example, any of these 4 elements might be missing: date is referenced using “today”, a year is
missing, the date comes before the place, or the acquirer and its ticker might not be mentioned
immediately after the date. Section C.3 provides an example.
We split the announcement identification procedure in 2 steps. The first and more re-
strictive step relies on the analysis of the beginning of the document only. The second step
applies less restrictive requirements on the set of deals that have no announcement document
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found after the first step. Put differently, the second step checks the deals with no announce-
ment found and picks the related documents that did not meet more restrictive criteria checked
in the first step.
The first step starts with requirements that a document:
• is an Exhibit 99 document,
• is neither defined as a conference call nor financial results release in the description field,
• does not contain conference call speech words, e.g. good day, dear etc. (see Section C.4
for the full list), which are typically not used in acquisition announcements, and
• contains words that indicate purchase (acquire, purchase, merge etc., see Section C.4).
A document is Exhibit 99 if its type field starts with ex-99, ex99 or ex 99, case-insensitive
(for example <TYPE>EX-99.1). We identify the body start in any of its possible forms men-
tioned earlier. We exploit regular expressions for that task. If the body start is not detected
within the first 300 words, we disregard the document. If we find the body start, we then in-
spect text before it, which is in fact the title section. If the title section contains no purchase
words nor the target name, but it contains the conference call (which are not the same as con-
ference call speech words), financial results, or public or tender offer words, we disregard the
document. Next, we check text that follows the body start. This is the point in text that usually
clearly specifies what the document talks about. A topic is usually clearly stated in the first
paragraph. We inspect 150 words that follow the body start and require that both purchase
words and the target name is detected. If a document passes all these checks, we label it as a
potential announcement. We say potential because there can be more than one document that
passes all checks. The requirements listed do not necessarily uniquely identify documents that
are acquisition announcements. For example, an 8-K filing may, despite not being an acqui-
sition announcement, mention the target and meet the rest of criteria (e.g. quarterly earnings
announcement, conference call transcripts, a presentation of the deal, etc.), or when an amend-
ment (8-K/A) is issued following the announcement (8-K).24 Even though we observe multiple
documents, only one, in fact, is the announcement itself.
The second step helps identify deal announcements that the first step fails to find. A
drawback is that it occasionally labels multiple documents as announcements what requires
manual inspection. However, the number of such cases is rather small as the first step already
did a good job for the major part of the deals. The second step is simpler than the first one.
It does not distinguish between the title section and announcement body, but relies simply on
the set of requirements that the full document has to meet in order to qualify as a potential
acquisition announcement. In addition to the content-based filters listed below, we require that
the minimum word count is more than 30 words and less than 5,000. in terms of content, we
require that a document:
• is an Exhibit 99 document,
• is neither indicated as a conference call nor a financial results release in the description
field,
• mentions the target name,
• contains words that indicate purchase (acquire, purchase, merge etc.), as in Section C.4
24We have also found cases of a company filing the same announcement two times within the same day (e.g.
CIK: 0000880460; “December 23, 2011 – Perfumania Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ:PERF) and Parlux Fragrances,
Inc. (NASDAQ:PARL) announced today that they have signed a definitive merger agreement...”)
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• contains announcement words either in the document description field or text (press re-
lease, acquisition announcement etc.), and
• contains a “forward-looking statement” disclosure.
SDC does not always record target names in the form they appear in the announce-
ments: short names are used, words such as Inc., Corp., etc. might be omitted, subsidiaries are
described if they do not have a name etc. For these reasons we use a fuzzy search procedure
(Section C.4).25 We require that the fuzzy match score is at least 70% in order to confirm
that the target name is found in the document.Forward looking statement is something that we
observe in all announcements checked, hence we include it in the list of requirements.
C.2 SDC and EDGAR inconsistencies
There are some inconsistencies regarding announcement dates between SDC and EDGAR. In
order to include cases like the one shown below, we have to allow for announcements made 1
business day before the announcement date in SDC.
Example:
SDC Deal Number: 2167136040
SDC Announcement date: 2010/03/24
SEC Filing Date: 2010-03-23
SEC 8K announcement text:
“ROGERS, Conn.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–March 23, 2010–Rogers Corporation (NYSE:
ROG) announced today that it has signed an agreement with SK Chemicals Co. Ltd. of
South Korea, to acquire SK Utis Co., Ltd., its high performance polyurethane foam man-
ufacturing unit located in Ansan, South Korea...”
25Packages that implement fuzzy search algorithms are readily available in Java. We use FuzzyWuzzy library.
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C.3 Typical acquisition Announcement structure
A typical announcement press release document has a title section that is followed by an an-
nouncement body. The title section can be very short and contain only the title, but there are
cases when it is rather long with many bullet points and additional information. The announce-
ment body typically starts with this structure: Place + Date + Acquirer + Acquirer Ticker
(Figure SA.1). Yet there is some variation. For example, any of this 4 elements might be miss-
ing, the date may be referenced using “today”, the year may be missing, the date may come
before the place, or acquirer and its ticker might be mentioned not immediately after the date.
NEWS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Telephone and Data
Systems Agrees to Acquire BendBroadband
Supports Cable and
Broadband Growth Strategy
Title section
CHICAGO, Ill., (May 1, 2014) - Telephone and Data
Systems, Inc. [NYSE: TDS], parent company to TDS
Telecom, today announced an agreement to acquire
substantially all of the assets of a group of
companies operating as BendBroadband, headquartered in
Bend, Oregon, for a purchase price of $261 million
...
Announcement body
Figure SA.1: Typical announcement press release
C.4 Target name detection (fuzzy matching)
Example:
1. SDC deal number: 2012952020
SDC target name: Pernod Ricard SA-Cruzan Rum
8K: 0001193125-08-189343
8K announcement text:
“Under the agreement, Pernod Ricard will pay Fortune Brands $230 million in pre-tax
proceeds, and Fortune Brands will pay $100 million to Pernod to acquire the premium
Cruzan Rum brand...”
2. SDC deal number: 1313490020
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SDC target name: Smurfit-Stone-Industrial Pkg
8K: 0000950144-02-007750
8K announcement text:
“Caraustar Industries, Inc. (NASDAQ-NMS Symbol: CSAR) today announced that it
has entered into a definitive agreement with a subsidiary of Smurfit-Stone Container
Corporation (NASDAQ:SSCC) to acquire substantially all the assets (excluding accounts
receivable) of Smurfit’s Industrial Packaging Group business for a purchase price of
approximately $79.8 million...”
3. SDC target name: Frank’s Tubular Intl Inc
8K announcement text:
“Dallas, TX, May 29, 2003—Lone Star Technologies, Inc. (“Lone Star”) (NYSE:LSS)
today announced that it has signed a definitive agreement to acquire the assets of Frank’s
Tubular International (“FTI”), a Houston-based provider of high-quality threading and
inspection services, ...”
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